Technical Report

Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, July 13-14, 1637

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Contents

I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................4
   Project Goals and Results .................................................................................................5
II. Preservation & Documentation of Pequot War Battlefield Sites .............................................6
   Preservation ........................................................................................................................6
   Documentation ....................................................................................................................6
   Defining the Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas ............................................................8
III. Historic Context ..............................................................................................................10
   Contact, Trade, and Pequot Expansion in Southern New England (1611-1636) ........10
   English Arrival and Dutch Conflict, 1633-1636 ................................................................12
      English Deaths: Stone (January 1634) and Oldham (July 1636) ...............................14
   The Pequot War ................................................................................................................15
      Massachusetts Bay Expedition to Block Island & Thames River (August 1636) ....15
      Siege of Saybrook Fort (September 1636 – March 1637) .........................................16
      Wethersfield Raid (April 23, 1637) ............................................................................17
      Connecticut’s Declaration of War (May 1, 1637) .........................................................17
      Mystic Campaign (May 10-27, 1637) ......................................................................18
      Mystic Fort Battle (5 a.m. – 9 a.m. May 26, 1637) ....................................................21
      Battle of the English Withdrawal (9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m., May 26, 1637) ...............22
      Quinnipiac Campaign (July 7-14, 1637) and Fairfield Swamp Fight (July 13-14, 1637) .................................................................25
      The Massachusetts Bay Phase of the War and The Quinnipiac Campaign .............27
      Treaty of Hartford (September 21, 1638) ................................................................33
IV. Order of Battle, Weaponry, and Tactics ........................................................................34
   Pequot Order of Battle ......................................................................................................34
      Pequot Armament & Tactics .......................................................................................34
      English Allied Order of Battle .....................................................................................41
      English Forces ...............................................................................................................42
      English Military Experience .........................................................................................42
      English Armament and Tactics ....................................................................................43
V. Methods, Site Identification & Documentation .................................................................52
   Battlefield Survey ............................................................................................................52
      Analysis of Primary Sources .......................................................................................53
      Field Methodology ........................................................................................................55
         Landholder Permission ..............................................................................................55
         Visual Inspection ........................................................................................................56
         Land Use Research ....................................................................................................56
      KOCOA Evaluation and Analysis ................................................................................56
         Terrain Analysis ........................................................................................................57
         Viewshed Analysis .....................................................................................................59
VI. Results and Battlefield Event Synthesis .........................................................................68
   Battle Narrative and Sequence ........................................................................................68
   Timeline ............................................................................................................................69
VII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................72
VIII. Works Cited ..................................................................................................................74
      Primary Source Materials ............................................................................................74
Secondary Source Materials........................................................................................................75
Appendix A. Land Use at Pequot Swamp .....................................................................................78
Appendix B: Quinnipiac Campaign Primary Source Excerpts ......................................................98

Figures:

Figure 1. Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas. 7.5’ U.S.G.S. Topographic Map .......... 9
Figure 2. Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Battlefield Boundary, Swamp, and Core Area...................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 3. Battlefields of the Pequot War (1636-1637). Red dots indicate where combat action occurred during the Pequot War, and blue indicate important ancillary sites. ..... 11
Figure 4. Monolithic Axe collected in Branford, CT................................................................. 37
Figure 5. Conical and Flat Cuprous Points Recovered from the Mistick Fort Site. .......... 39
Figure 6. USGS Map 1893........................................................................................................ 61
Figure 7. U.S. Coastal and Geodetic Chart, Southport 1880............................................... 61
Figure 8. Viewshed from Top of Mill Hill .............................................................................. 62
Figure 9. Viewshed from Lower Elevation Southwest of Mill Hill Summit. ............... 63
Figure 10. Viewshed from Lower Elevation on Mill Hill South of Summit. ............... 64
Figure 11. Viewshed Southwest of Mill Hill Summit. ....................................................... 65
Figure 12. Viewshed from Southernmost Elevation............................................................. 66
Figure 13. Viewshed from Sasqua Village Location Northwest Corner of Fairfield Swamp................................................................................................................................. 67
Figure 14. Viewshed from Sasqua Village Southwest Corner of Fairfield Swamp. ..... 68

Tables:

Table 1: Key Terrain Features & KO/COA Analysis................................................................. 58
Table 2: Battlefield Event Timeline of Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp.............. 70
I. Introduction

This technical report summarizes the research, methods, and results of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp which took place on July 13-14, 1637. A National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program (NPS ABPP) Site Identification and Documentation grant (GA-2287-15-008) was awarded in July 2015 to the Fairfield Museum and History Center (FMHC). This NPS ABPP grant is part of a larger effort to identify and preserve all of the battlefields associated with the Pequot War (1636-1637). The overall goal of the grant was to conduct a pre-inventory research and documentation project to identify the probable locations of the engagements and ancillary sites related to the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, the last major battle of the Pequot War which took place in the present-day Southport section of Fairfield, Connecticut. The Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp project involved historically chronicling a series of sustained actions between the Pequot and the English Allied forces on July 13-14, 1637, and identifying properties which could potentially yield evidence of the battle.

The Pequot War began in late August 1636 when a force of 20 Massachusetts Bay soldiers attacked and burned a Pequot village along the Thames River and killed several Pequot in retaliation for the murders of Captain John Stone and his crew two years earlier along the Connecticut River. In response, the Pequot laid siege to Saybrook Fort at the mouth of the Connecticut River from September 1636 through March 1637. The siege was lifted in mid-March with the arrival of 19 Massachusetts Bay soldiers under the command of Captain John Underhill. The Pequot then shifted the focus of their attacks on the upriver English settlements and attacked Wethersfield on April 23, 1637, killing 11 colonists, including women and children.

After the Pequot attack on Wethersfield on April 23, 1637 Connecticut declared war on the Pequot on May 1 and the English called on an army of 90 men and 250 Native

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1 The NPS ABPP promotes the preservation of significant historic battlefields associated with wars on American soil. The purpose of the program is to assist citizens, public and private institutions, and governments at all levels in planning, interpreting, and protecting sites where historic battles were fought on American soil during the armed conflicts that shaped the growth and development of the United States, in order that present and future generations may learn and gain inspiration from the ground where Americans made their ultimate sacrifice. The goals of the program are: 1) to protect battlefields and sites associated with armed conflicts that influenced the course of American history, 2) to encourage and assist all Americans in planning for the preservation, management, and interpretation of these sites, and 3) to raise awareness of the importance of preserving battlefields and related sites for future generations (further information can be found at www.nps.gov/abpp).
allies who invaded Pequot country. This resulted in the Mistick Campaign (May 10-26, 1637), during which the Battles of Mistick Fort and the English Withdrawal took place (May 25-26, 1637). Historians generally focus on the short, yet intense, Battle of Mistick Fort (also known as the “Mystic Massacre”) of May 26, 1637, which often overshadows several important combat actions and battles that occurred in the subsequent months. After the Battles of Mistick Fort and the English Withdrawal, the Pequot lost 500 men - half their military strength. Subsequently, the Pequot fled their homeland to seek safety with their native kin and allies across the region. The largest group went under the chief Pequot sachem or leader Sassacus who fled down the Connecticut coast (toward present-day Fairfield) with the intention of going north up the Housatonic River to reach the Mohawk and to seek aid in their war against the English. Sassacus left the group at Quinnipiac (New Haven, CT) and continued north to Mohawk country (Albany, NY). The remainder of his group continued to Fairfield to seek safety with the Sosa and Saqua allies where they were attacked by the English on July 13-14. The Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp was the last major engagement of the Pequot War.

Project Goals and Results

The goals of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Documentation Plan were to:

1. Identify archives and institutions which may contain primary sources relevant to the battle;
2. Identify and analyze primary and secondary sources relevant to the battle;
3. Visit historical societies, libraries, and archives which may contain Pequot War-era objects;
4. Identify the Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas of the battlefield;
5. Conduct a Windshield Survey of the Battlefield Boundary;
6. Conduct KOCOA analysis (military terrain analysis) to identify key terrain features and possible route(s) taken by the English;
7. Integrate battlefield landscape and key terrain onto USGS maps;
8. Develop PowerPoint presentations and hold public informational meetings;
9. Create GIS mapping of battlefield terrain and cultural features; and;
II. Preservation & Documentation of Pequot War Battlefield Sites

Preservation

The long-term preservation goals set by the Fairfield Museum and History Center for the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp project are to raise public awareness of the existence and importance of the battlefield site and its associated historical significance through lectures, educational programs, publications, and community-based preservation initiatives. The immediate goal is to determine the Battlefield Boundary and Core Area for a future cultural resource inventory. The ultimate goal is to nominate the site of this significant battle to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).

Battlefield surveys are an important aspect of historic preservation as many battlefield sites are destroyed or negatively impacted through ignorance of their location and significance. Many battlefields would be preserved if property owners and communities were aware of their existence and were informed of the significance of the battlefield and its contribution to a broader understanding and appreciation of American history. Preserved battlefields and related historic sites can add to a community’s sense of identity and foster a greater interest in history and preservation efforts. The identification, documentation, and mapping of a battlefield’s historic and cultural resources are an essential first step for battlefield preservation efforts. An important step in this direction will be the eventual submission of a NRHP nomination form associated with the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp (July 13-14, 1637).

Documentation

The first steps in documenting a battlefield are to identify and delineate the extent of the battlefield based on battlefield terrain (e.g., hills, swamps, rivers, and other terrain features relevant to the battle), the distribution of battle-related objects (e.g., musket balls, brass arrow points, firearms/firearm parts, and dropped and broken equipment) associated with critical terrain features, relevant cultural features (e.g., roads, bridges, and towns), and an assessment of the physical and visual integrity of the battlefield. This process requires establishing a boundary around the battlefield that encompasses all relevant battle-related artifacts and cultural and physical features into an appropriately scaled topographic base map using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The boundary must be defensible based
on historical and archeological evidence (*i.e.*, documents, field survey, terrain analysis, and archeological surveys), and encompass legitimate historic resources. The following three boundaries are created for a battlefield:

- **Battlefield Boundary**: Currently understood boundary of the battlefield
- **Core Area**: Area of concentrated combat
- **Potential National Register Boundary**: Portions of the battlefield that have retained integrity

The Battlefield Boundary is a concept recently introduced in the NPS ABPP’s revised *Battlefield Survey Manual* (2016) to replace the earlier concept of the Study Area (Figures 1 and 2). A weakness of the original concept of the battlefield “study area” was that it was too broad and vague, as it was defined as the furthest extent of the field. The concept was often equated with the Project Area or Vicinity Area of a general study which may include buffers in the boundary of land that really had little value to understanding the battlefield and served to devalue the historic resource. In addition, many investigators used the term to indicate that there was no historic value outside of the Core Area of the battlefield. For these reasons, the ABPP decided to change the term to indicate that the Battlefield Boundary is indeed the currently understood boundary of the battlefield.

The NPS ABPP has developed an approach to research, document, and map battlefields that has proven to be highly successful. These methods were originally developed for Civil War battlefields and later applied to many Revolutionary War battlefields. The seventeenth century battlefields of the Pequot War present unique challenges for historians and battlefield archeologists to research, survey, document, and delineate battlefield boundaries given the nature of seventeenth century sources and the relatively low density and frequency of artifacts associated with seventeenth century battlefields in North America. Nonetheless, the methods outlined in Chapter V (Research Design, Methods, Site Identification & Documentation) have proven highly successful in documenting Pequot War battlefields and associated actions and sites.

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Defining the Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas

Defining the Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas of the battlefield site is a critical part of the battlefield documentation process.\(^3\) The Battlefield Boundary is defined as the area which encompasses the ground over which units maneuvered in preparation for combat and where combat action occurred. The Battlefield Boundary area functions as the tactical context and visual setting of the Battlefield. The natural features and contours on relevant USGS 7.5-minute quadrangle maps are used to outline the Battlefield Boundary and include all those locations that directly contributed to the development and conclusion of the battle. The Battlefield Boundary should include the following:

- Core Areas of combat
- locations of all deployed units of the combatants on the field, even reserves
- preliminary skirmishing if it led directly to the battle, and
- logistical areas of the armies (supply trains, hospitals, ammunition dumps, etc.).

The Battlefield Boundary is restricted to the immediate flow of battle after one side or the other has moved to initiate combat. For example, in terms of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, the Battlefield Boundary begins at the Mill River in present-day Southport and the imposing heights of Mill Hill. This battlefield is defined thus because it was at Mill Hill that the English Allied forces began their pursuit of fleeing Pequot which led them to the Sasqua village and Munnacommock Swamp. The Battlefield Boundary encompasses Mill Hill and lands surrounding the Munnacommock Swamp site as the battle occurred in and around the confines of that wetland.

The Core Area should always fall fully within the Battlefield Boundary. The natural features and contours on the USGS 7.5-minute quadrant map help to define a Core Area that contains the areas of most intense conflict. Natural barriers, such as rivers, creeks, swamps, hills, and ridges, often restrict the movement of the armies, sometimes providing a natural landscape or topographical boundary for the battlefield. Generally, Battlefield Boundaries can be reasonably well defined in Revolutionary and Civil War battlefields based on better documentation and maps compared to seventeenth century Pequot War battlefields. There are no known period maps which document Pequot War battles, and the

documentation associated with these early American actions with respect to battle locations are ambiguous.

![Figure 1. Battlefield Boundary and Core Areas. 7.5’ U.S.G.S. Topographic Map](image)

An important aspect of the Battlefield Boundary and Core Area is the delineation of portions of the historic battlefield landscape that still convey a sense of the historic scene (retain visual and physical integrity) and can still be preserved. Any areas of the Battlefield Boundary or Core Area that have been impacted or otherwise compromised by modern development, erosion, or other destructive forces and can no longer provide a feeling of the historic setting are excluded from areas of integrity. However, some battlefields in suburban areas may still retain integrity and significance if artifacts or other archeological information (i.e., campfires and ditches, etc.) are intact. In such instances the presence of houses may affect the feeling of the historic setting but information is present that will contribute to the significance of the battlefield.
Figure 2. Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Battlefield Boundary, Swamp, and Core Area

III. Historic Context

The Pequot War (1636-1637) consisted of several major battles and minor actions fought between September 1636 and August 1637 throughout southern New England (Figure 3). Thousands of combatants, including the English, Pequot, and other Natives (Narragansett, Niantic, Mohegan, Podunk, and Connecticut River Valley tribes), fought both with and against the English. The causes of the Pequot War are best explained within the political, economic, and military spheres, as cultural exchange grew with the arrival of the Dutch (1611) and the English (early 1630s) within coastal southern New England and the Connecticut River Valley.

Contact, Trade, and Pequot Expansion in Southern New England (1611-1636)

Within a decade after the arrival of the Dutch, the Pequot positioned themselves to control the fur and wampum trade (purple and white beads fashioned from whelk and hard
shell clam), key territory, and resources through warfare, coercion, subjugation, and alliances over much of southern New England. As the Pequot dominated Long Island Sound and the lower Connecticut River Valley, they controlled wampum production and the primary conduit of furs – the northern drainages to the coast of the Connecticut River.

Figure 3. Battlefields of the Pequot War (1636-1637). Red dots indicate where combat action occurred during the Pequot War, and blue indicate important ancillary sites.

Wampum from eastern Long Island Sound quickly became the most important component of the fur trade as it was in great demand by tribes in the fur-rich interior areas of the upper Connecticut and Hudson River drainages. The Dutch referred to wampum as “the source and mother of the beaver trade” and identified Long Island Sound as the “mint” of production. By the mid-1620s, an estimated of 150,000 – 200,000 wampum beads were acquired yearly by the Dutch for the northern fur trade. The wampum-producing regions of eastern Long Island Sound were the first areas to fall under Pequot control in the 1620s, followed by the lower Connecticut River Valley in 1631. That year the Dutch reported:

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Wahginnacut, a sagamore upon Quonehtacut [Connecticut River near Hartford] … was at war with the Pekoath [Pequot] … [and they] agreed to meet on the field of battle with their entire forces and to engage in combat, with the condition that the victor would remain, for himself and his successors, forever lord and rightful owner of the aforesaid river Fresh [Connecticut] River. After three separate battles in open field, Meautiany, chief of the Pequatoos, held the field and was victor; Sequeen [sachem of the Wangunk] was so beaten and defeated that he became the subject of the Pequotoos.  

On the eve of the Pequot War the Pequot controlled a territory of over 2,500 square miles stretching 75 miles along the Connecticut and Long Island coastlines and 50 miles up the Connecticut River. Their subjugation of tribes included placing tribes in a tributary relationship and territorial control of the lands of tribes was claimed by right of conquest. In this way, the Pequot controlled key resources within their domains; they dictated the manner and the amount of furs and wampum that would reach the Dutch and English, as well as the distribution of European trade goods to tributary and allied tribes.

Dutch and English goods commonly traded to the Native peoples of the region included duffel cloth, axes, hoes, adzes, pot hooks, drills, kettles, looking glasses, jaw harps, spoons, and glass beads. Archeological sites at Native-occupied villages and encampments such as Mistick Fort (Site 59-19), Pequot Woods Village (Site 59-73), and the Porter’s Rocks Native Allied Encampment (Site 59-34) yielded numerous European trade goods and materials. Natives often modified, reworked, and reintegrated these European objects into their own cultural systems. They assimilated these materials and items into their customs, and used them differently than how they were originally intended. For example, artifacts found at Pequot War-era sites were modified into Native functional and ideological uses, such as iron and brass kettles cut and reworked into arrow projectile points and lead, brass, and iron objects molded into decorative and spiritual objects such as beads and amulets.

English Arrival and Dutch Conflict, 1633-1636

Between 1611 and 1633 both the Dutch and Pequot benefitted from their exclusive trading relationship and respective control of their economic and political spheres. The

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period could be described as relatively calm but potentially volatile. The careful balance was disrupted during the Fall of 1633 when thousands of Natives throughout the Northeast died from a smallpox epidemic that swept through the region in 1633-1634. Coincident with the epidemic hundreds of English traders and settlers migrated into the Connecticut River Valley in 1633-1635. Tensions heightened and regional trade stability waned as the English and other Native tribes attempted to break Pequot trade and military dominance over the region. The English disregarded Pequot claims to the valley and established settlements at Windsor, Wethersfield, Hartford, and Saybrook; the land previously purchased from the local (subjugated) sachems and with whom they sought trade relations. The subjugated and tributary tribes saw an opportunity to escape Pequot hegemony, and pursued alliances with and protection from the English.

Little studied is the Pequot-Dutch War, the first major conflict between Native Americans and Europeans in New England. It began during the Winter of 1633-1634 and continued through the Fall of 1634 (January 1634 – November 1634), as stated by Winthrop in his journal entry that the Pequot “were now in a war with the Narragansett and the Dutch.” The Pequot-Dutch War further strained economic and cultural relationships within the region. The English tried to break the Dutch-Pequot monopoly over trade, while the Pequot tried to maintain their political and economic dominance.

The Pequot-Dutch War was the first time the Pequot encountered Europeans on a battlefield. As many as 70 Dutch Marines in the Connecticut River Valley were stationed at the Dutch trading post House of Hope in an attempt to drive the English from the Windsor trading post. As a result of their experiences, the Pequot adjusted their strategies to counter English battle formations, tactics, and weapons. Two years later the Pequot refused to fight the English in the open field (with few exceptions during extreme circumstances). Instead, they relied on feints, ruses, rushes, and ambushes in order to draw the English closer and aim their brass tipped arrows at the weak points in English armor and buff coats during the Pequot War. These tactics were very successful during the Pequot Siege of Saybrook Fort (September 1636 – March 1637), and in turn, impacted English battle plans for and consequential

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reactionary measures through the Mistick Fort Campaign (May 10-26, 1637).

*English Deaths: Stone (January 1634) and Oldham (July 1636)*

Most often cited in secondary historical accounts as the cause of the Pequot War are the murders of Captain John Stone and his eight-man crew along the Connecticut River by the Pequot. In reality, these murders were the result of rising tensions between numerous Native and European cultural entities who each struggled to gain and maintain power in a volatile region. The murders of English trader John Stone and his crew, related only by English sources, indicate that the Dutch inadvertently played an important role. In January 1634, Stone and his crew kidnapped several Western Niantic Indians, allies of the Pequot, and demanded that they guide them upriver to the Dutch trading post (the House of Hope) at Hartford. While anchored near the mouth of the Connecticut River one night, John Stone and eight crew members were killed by the Pequot.

John Winthrop, Deputy Governor of Massachusetts Bay, noted Stone’s murder in his journal, but not the motivations.9 John Stone was not well-liked by the English at Massachusetts or Plymouth and was portrayed as a pirate, smuggler, and fornicator. However, he was highly regarded by the Dutch in New Amsterdam, including the Dutch Governor of New Amsterdam.10 Following the murders, a Pequot ambassador gave the explanation; “could yee blame us for so cruel a murder? For we distinguish not between the Dutch and the English, but took them to be one nation.”11 Their reasons for the murders are still unclear; the crew may have been killed during a rescue attempt the Western Niantics, and/or in mistaken retaliation for the recent death of the Pequot sachem Tatobam (who was killed by the Dutch sometime in 1633).

The Pequot could not afford another conflict. In early November 1634, they sent “a messenger … to desire our [English] friendship. He brought two bundles of sticks, whereby he signified how many beaver and otter skins he would give us for that end, and great store of wampomage, (about two busheles, by his description).”12 Winthrop recorded that,

the reason why they desired our friendship was, because they [Pequot] were now in war with the Narragansett, whom, til this year, they had kept under,

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and likewise with the Dutch, who had killed their old sachem and some other of their men, for that the Pekods had killed some Indians, who came to trade with the Dutch at Connecticut; and, by these occasions, they could not trade safely any where.\(^{13}\)

A tentative agreement between the Pequot and the English determined that the Pequot would turn over their rights to Connecticut, and those “worthy of death” murderers, if Massachusetts Bay brokered a peace treaty with the Narragansett and the English sent a pinnacle for trade.

However, the Pequot refused to turn over the murderers partly or largely because they felt their actions were justified. By the spring of 1636, tensions were further exacerbated by reports that the Pequot prepared to attack other English traders.\(^ {14}\) On July 1, 1636, Governor Vane of Massachusetts Bay sent an instructive and frustrated letter to John Winthrop, Jr. with instructions to meet with the Pequot at Saybrook. If the Pequot did not give satisfaction to the English over Stone’s death, then Winthrop was to return the gift of wampum given in November 1634. While no records exist from the meeting, the gift of wampum was returned. Less than three weeks later, the English trader John Oldham was killed off Block Island. Although the Pequot were initially blamed, it was quickly determined the Manisses of Block Island were responsible. As a result, Massachusetts Bay responded with military action against the Manisses for Oldham’s murder and against the Pequot for Stone’s murder two years before.

The Pequot War

*Massachusetts Bay Expedition to Block Island & Thames River (August 1636)*

In August 1636, Massachusetts Bay ordered a punitive expedition against the Manisses and the Pequot in retribution for the murders of John Stone and crew and John Oldham. Under the command of Colonel John Endicott a force of ninety soldiers sailed from Boston on August 24, bound first to Block Island and then to Pequot territory. They were ordered,

> to put to death the men of Block Island, but to spare the women and children, and to bring them away, and to take possession of the island; and from

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\(^{13}\) Winthrop, *Winthrop’s Journal*. Pp. 138-139.

thence to go to the Pequods to demand the murderers of Capt. Stone and other English, and one thousand fathom of wampom for damages, etc., and some of their children as hostages, which if they should refuse, they were to obtain it by force.\textsuperscript{15}

At Block Island, the Endicott expedition disembarked from their boats into the surf, approximately one hundred yards from Crescent (present-day East) Beach. As they waded ashore the men were met with a volley of arrows fired by 60 Manisses; the English returned fire, and the Manisses quickly retreated. The Endicott expedition then established a base camp in an abandoned village near their anchored ships and for two days proceeded to search the island per their orders. The English burned several villages and destroyed cornfields while the Manisseans fled to the many swamps on Block Island for safety.

The Endicott expedition embarked at Block Island for Saybrook, and at their arrival, Lion Gardiner (commander of the Saybrook Fort) was less than pleased with their commission to confront the Pequot. Gardiner was well aware that Saybrook would take the brunt of any Pequot retaliation and admonished Massachusetts Bay, “you come hither to raise these wasps about my eare, and then you will take wing and flye away.” During the first week of September, Endicott and twenty Massachusetts Bay men (including John Underhill) arrived and disembarked on the east side of the Pequot (Thames) River. Negotiations were unsuccessful, and the English burned a village and attacked and killed several Pequot, thus beginning “the war between the Indians and us (English) in these parts.”\textsuperscript{16}

Siege of Saybrook Fort (September 1636 – March 1637)

The Pequot viewed the Endicott expedition and the attack on their villages as unprovoked and quickly retaliated against the English at Saybrook. For the next six months (September 1636 – March 1637), the Pequot laid siege to the fort and settlement at Saybrook at the mouth of the Connecticut River. Over 30 English settlers, traders, and soldiers were killed in and around Saybrook during the siege, including half of the fort’s

\textsuperscript{15} Winthrop, \textit{Winthrop's Journal}. P. 186
garrison. The Pequot attacked any English who ventured too far from the fort and repeatedly lured them into ambushes. They also destroyed English provisions and livestock, burned trading warehouses, and disrupted all river traffic to the upriver colonies of Windsor, Wethersfield, and Hartford. Pequot successes were achieved without firearms, notwithstanding the best efforts of Lieutenant Gardiner to counter their tactics. During this period, the Pequot won every engagement against the English. They proved themselves superior to the English on the battlefield, likely due to their experiences during the Pequot-Dutch War. In early April 1637, Massachusetts Bay sent twenty soldiers under Captain John Underhill to relieve the siege at Saybrook Fort, and the Pequot shifted their attention to the English settlements upriver.

Wethersfield Raid (April 23, 1637)

A force of more than 100 Pequot attacked the English settlement at Wethersfield on April 23, 1637. The Pequot killed nine men, a woman, and a girl, and captured two girls from the Swaine family. The attack on Wethersfield caught the settlers by surprise. In spite of the siege at Saybrook, the Connecticut Colony had not yet declared war against the Pequot as they felt the actions by Massachusetts Bay against the Pequot the previous September were unjustified. However, the Wethersfield attack (the first time women and children had been killed in the war) galvanized the General Court of Connecticut into declaring an offensive war against the Pequot.

Connecticut’s Declaration of War (May 1, 1637)

In direct response to the Wethersfield attack the General Court of Connecticut declared war on the Pequot. On May 1, 1637, the Court at Hartford ordered “an offensive war ag' the Pequot and 90 men (thirteen were sailors) levied out of the 3 Plantations, Hartford, Wethersfield & Windsor ... It is ordered that every souldier shall cary with him

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17 All of the following dates used to reconstruct the Mistick Campaign are based on times, dates, and references to the “Sabbath” which are found throughout the relevant primary Pequot War narratives. Recorded dates were in the Julian calendar, generally used by most European countries during the seventeenth century. The Julian calendar year consists of 365 days divided into twelve months with a leap year occurring every four years. The Gregorian calendar superseded the Julian calendar and in 1752, the British Empire adopted the new system. Even so, the Julian calendar remained in use in the Americas well into the early nineteenth century.

1lb of powder, 4 of shott, 20 bulletts … 1 barrel of Powder from the Rivers mouth [Saybrook Fort], (a light) Gunn if they can.”19 The court appointed Captain John Mason commander; Robert Seeley, William Pratt, and Thomas Bull lieutenants; and eight men sergeants. It is believed that commissioned and non-commissioned officers on the expedition had previous combat experience in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), as well as many of the enlisted men. The three towns were also to supply twenty sets of armor, arm their soldiers with firearms, poles, edged weapons, and accoutrements, and provide provisions that could sustain the army for a prolonged two-week campaign.

**Mistick Campaign (May 10-27, 1637)**

The Connecticut English organized the Mistick Campaign expedition in little over one week. The English soldiers rendezvoused first at Hartford with the Mohegan and Wangunk (60-80 men) on May 10 and then together proceeded downriver to Saybrook. Arriving at Saybrook on May 17, Mason appraised Captain John Underhill and Lieutenant Gardiner of the General Court’s orders to conduct a frontal assault against the Pequot along the Thames River. Mason asked for their assistance, which Underhill and Gardiner refused:

> we both said they were not fitted for such a design [attack plan] and we said to Major Mason we wondered he would venture himselfe being no better fitted and he said the Magistrates could or would not fend better, the we said yt none of our men would go with them and neither should they go unless we yt were bred soldiers from our youth could see some likelihood to do better than the [Massachusetts] bay men with their strong commission last year [September 1636 Block Island & Thames River expedition].20

Unlike Mason, both Gardiner and Underhill had experience fighting against the Pequot. They knew the Pequot would not confront traditional English battle formations.

The three English commanders revised the battle plan based on Gardiner’s and Underhill’s experiences, the information obtained from the two Swaine girls, and a plan of attack proposed by the Narragansett (reiterated by Roger Williams). The Dutch had rescued the two Swaine girls captured from Wethersfield, who had spent three weeks in Pequot country. The girls informed the English commanders on the number and disposition of

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Pequot forces, the location of the two forts, and the number of firearms in the Pequot’s possession.\textsuperscript{21} The new plan of attack was based on surprise and containment which mitigated Pequot mobility, superior numbers, and tactics. The change of the design directly disobeyed the General Court’s orders and was potentially a case of serious misconduct, which is likely why Mason took the time to pen the group’s rationale:

First, the Pequots our enemies, kept a continual guard upon the river night and day. Secondly, their numbers far exceeded ours; having sixteen guns with powder and shot, as we were informed by the two captives … Thirdly, they were on land, and being swift on foot might much impede our landing, and possibly dishearten our men; we being expected only by land, there being no other place to go on Shoar but in that River nearer than Narragansett. Fourthly, by Narragansett we should come upon their backs and possibly might surprise them unaware, at worst we should be on firm land as well as they.\textsuperscript{22}

The plan was to conduct simultaneous nighttime attacks on the two Pequot fortified villages, Mistick Fort (Pequot Hill) and Weinshauks (Fort Hill). Mistick Fort was one-half mile west of the Mystic River and Weinshauks located 2.5 miles further southwest. Not coincidentally, the fortified villages were the residences of the two chief sachems of the Pequot, Sassacus (Mistick), and Momoho (Weinshauks). A surprise attack on the Pequot and their two vital leaders within the confines of a palisade negated Pequot tactical advantages of maneuver, mobility, and use of terrain.

In their planned ruse, the expedition intentionally sailed through Long Island Sound by the Pequot coastline in full view of the Pequot who thought they were reluctant to land their force. The expedition arrived at Narragansett Bay on May 20 at Narragansett (Figure 3). The force was delayed several days due to weather conditions and prolonged Narragansett negotiations. The delays concerned Mason; the more time that went by the higher the chance the English Allied forces would lose their element of surprise. Mason chose not to linger for an additional 40 Massachusetts Bay soldiers less than a day’s march away in Providence. Approximately 250 Narragansett and Eastern Niantic men agreed to join the English Allied force and on May 24 the expedition marched towards the Mystic River, arriving on the evening of May 25 (Figure 3).

\textsuperscript{21} Underhill, \textit{Newes from America.} P. 25.
By the time the expedition crossed the Pawcatuck River into Pequot territory several of the English soldiers began to succumb to the heat and forced march. The expedition marched 35 miles in unseasonably hot weather with each soldier burdened with an estimated 65 pounds or more of arms, equipment, and provisions. Their late arrival at the Mistick River and overall condition precluded a nighttime attack on either Pequot fort, Weinshauks or Mistick. Consequently, Mason altered the plan to attack only Mistick Fort at dawn the next day (May 26, 1637).

The English and their Native allies established two short-term encampments at a place known as Porter’s Rocks (Native Encampment, Site 72-34; and English Encampment, Site 72-35), a large bedrock formation stretching for a half mile west of the Mystic River and rising more than 100 ft. above the surrounding landscape. Porter’s Rocks was easily defended with its commanding view, and was located only two miles north of Mistick Fort. Two Pequot men, Wequash and Wuttackquiackommin, guided the English through Pequot country. Roger Williams described them as “valiant men, especially the latter, who have lived these three or four years with the Nanhiggonticks [Narragansett], and know every pass and passage amongst them.” Mason placed a great deal of emphasis on intelligence gathering during the Mistick Campaign, and sent a Native ally (presumably Narragansett, Mohegan, or one of the Pequot guides) ahead of the approaching column to determine if the Pequot were aware the expedition was approaching: “They having sent an Indian to discover beforehand, brought us news that they [Pequot] were secure, having been fishing with many Canoes at Sea, and diverse of them walking here and there.” The English Allied force reached Porter’s Rocks around 8 p.m., set out sentries, and rested for a few hours, rising at 1 a.m. for the two-mile march to Pequot Hill. What English commanders and Native Allied leaders did not know was the fact that the Pequot were somehow alerted to the presence of English forces on the march from Narragansett. Sometime that evening, Sassacus sent significant reinforcements “the very Night before this Assault, One hundred and fifty Men from their other Fort [Weinshauks], to join with them of that Place [Mistick], who were designed as some of themselves reported to go forth against the English.”

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24 Hubbard, Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians. P. 126
25 Mason in Prince Brief History of the Pequot War. P. 10.
Mistick Fort Battle (5 a.m. – 9 a.m. May 26, 1637)

The Allied force reached the base of Pequot Hill just before dawn at around 4 a.m. and made a brief stop to make their final preparations for the attack (English Approach and Final Stop, Site 59-37). The plan of attack was to divide the 77 English soldiers into two groups of 38/39 men each under Mason and Underhill, “There being two Entrances into the Fort, intending to enter both at once: Captain Mason leading up to that on the Northeast side and Underhill to the Southwest.”

The plan was to surround the fort and fire an initial volley through the palisade walls, and then one-half of each division was to enter the fort “to destroy them by the sword and save the plunder.” The remaining English and Natives were to form inner (English) and outer (Native allies to prevent the Pequot from escaping) rings. The battle plan went awry almost immediately as Mason’s division was discovered “approaching within one Rod, heard a Dog bark and an Indian crying Owanux! Owanux! which is Englishmen! Englishmen!”

Mason was forced to begin the battle before all the English were in position and “called up our Forces with all expedition, gave Fire upon them through the Pallizado.” Mason and his squad forced their way through the narrow entrance filled with brush. Although Mason’s entrance into the fort was not contested, the Pequot quickly recovered and mounted a determined defense. The battle was underway before Captain Underhill’s company was in position and his men hurried to find the southwest entrance.

Unknown to the English, the normal complement of 75 Pequot defenders in a village of 150 women and children was reinforced the night before with an additional 150 men. The complement of Pequot defenders inside the fort when the attack took place neared 225 fighting men. Mason’s and Underhill’s narratives described intense hand to hand fighting within the fort, and the closely packed wigwams greatly reduced the effectiveness of the English weapons. Within 15-20 minutes, Mason’s seventeen-man company suffered eleven dead or wounded – a casualty rate of 60%. Mason realized he was losing the battle and decided set fire to the fort and retreat outside the palisade walls. The fire quickly swept through the closely packed wigwams fanned by a brisk northeast wind and engulfed the

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26 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. P. 7.
27 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. P. 8.
28 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. P. 8.
29 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. P. 8.
fort in minutes. By the time Underhill and his men arrived in position and fought their way into the southwestern entrance the northeastern end of the fort was already on fire. Underhill lit additional fires with a trail of gunpowder and ordered his men to retreat to the outside of the fort. There, the English Allied forces killed nearly all survivors who attempted to escape from the southwest entrance. The battle lasted little more than an hour and left 400 Pequot dead, 200 of them burned to death. Only a dozen or so were reported to have escaped.

After the conclusion of the Mistick Fort battle, the English withdrew one kilometer south along Pequot Hill to a location overlooking Long Island Sound (English Rest and Vantage Point; Site 59-37). There, they waited to observe their ships sailing west towards the rendezvous point at the Pequot (Thames) River. The English remained in this locale for approximately two hours; they tended to their wounded and defended against Pequot counterattacks. Edward Johnson, a Massachusetts Bay soldier during the Pequot War and author of Wonder Working Providence, echoed the English Allied forces’ precarious situation: “had the Indians knowne how much weakened our Souldiers were at present, they might have borne them downe with their multitude.”30 The English Allied force repulsed three Pequot counterattacks during the two hours spent on Pequot Hill after the Battle of Mistick Fort. The Pequot’s initial counterattacks were uncoordinated and ineffective, an immediate response of the men from the closest Pequot villages to the south and west of Mistick Fort. As the fighting intensified a contingent of approximately 50 Narragansett left the main force and headed north towards their home when they were attacked by a larger Pequot force. They were ultimately rescued by Captain Underhill and a company of soldiers.

Battle of the English Withdrawal (9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m., May 26, 1637)

The Battle of the English Withdrawal began shortly after the English spotted their ships sailing through Long Island Sound. After the second Pequot counterattack and Underhill’s return to the English Rest and Vantage Point, the English Allied force saw their ships sailing through Long Island Sound to the rendezvous at Pequot Harbor. The English Allied forces formed a column, with Captain Mason at the front and Captain Underhill at


the rear. This formation allowed the English Allied forces to march together and if needed, rapidly respond to resist and check Pequot counterattacks during their 6.5-mile withdrawal west through Pequot country towards the Thames River.

Understanding the overall state of the English Allied force, including the condition and status of the men, weapons, ammunition and supplies, is an important aspect in reconstructing the route, events, movements, and tactical decisions made by English commanders during the Battle of the English Withdrawal. The Allied force had already marched 35 miles and fought a major battle on very little rest. They were low on rations and ammunition, and sustained heavy casualties during the Battle of Mistick Fort (30% or more of the English contingent and an unknown number of Native allies). Now they faced an experienced and determined enemy highly motivated to exact revenge as hundreds of Pequot fighting men organized attacks and mobilized from other villages towards the English and Allied force. As expressed in the historical record, the English forces were insecure about safely reaching their ships, six miles away at the Thames and through hostile Pequot country. The professionalism and experience of key officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who were veterans of the Thirty Years War in the lowlands of Europe solidified the English soldiers. However, the commitment and courage of the Narragansett (the largest contingent of the English Native allies) was suspect.

Shortly before the English began their march towards Pequot Harbor (present day Thames River harbor) Mason stated that around 300 Pequot warriors from Weinshauks arrived on the battlefield. The arrival of reinforcements nearly two hours after the Mistick Fort Battle concluded suggests Sassacus mobilized a large force and possibly developed a strategy to destroy the invaders. Captain Mason led some men forward to engage the warriors, but the Pequot broke off quickly, likely in an effort to reach Mistick Fort. As the English began their withdrawal and vacated Pequot Hill the Pequot circumvented them and made their way to the summit of Pequot Hill where they saw the remains of the burned Mistick Fort and 400 of their dead kinsmen. The Allied column was one-quarter mile down the western slope of Pequot Hill when the 300 Pequot men launched a furious assault from the burned fort (one-half mile away):

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And Marching about one quarter of a Mile; the Enemy coming up to the Place where the Fort was, and beholding what was done, stamped and tore the Hair from their Heads: And after a little space, came mounting down the Hill upon us, in a full career, as if they would over run us; But when they came within Shot, the Rear faced about, giving Fire upon them: Some of them being Shot, made the rest more wary: Yet they held on running to and fro, and shooting their Arrows at Random.  

The Pequot attacked the rear of the English Allied column, one-quarter mile west from the summit of Pequot Hill. Mason, at the head of the column, was probably several hundred yards further away and perhaps had already reached a small stream at the base of Pequot Hill. As the English described the terrain as “champion [open] country,” the visibility the terrain afforded allowed the English to prepare their defense against the Pequot who were in full view as they mounted their attack down Pequot Hill. The rear of the column, led by Underhill, turned and fired several volleys into the charging Pequot which broke the attack. English Allied forces made a brief stop at a stream at the bottom of Pequot Hill (present-day Fishtown Brook) “where we rested and refreshed ourselves, having by that time taught them a little more Manners than to disturb us.” The English fought off Pequot attacks for the remainder of the withdrawal, ending only when the English Allied forces were within two miles of Pequot Harbor (present-day Pequannock Bridge, Groton, CT). At the end of their six-mile march, the English marched to the top of a hill overlooking Pequot Harbor “with our colours flying” and saw their vessels at anchor.

English sources claim that they killed more Pequot men during the withdrawal than the approximately 200 men killed during the Battle of Mistick Fort. For their part the Pequot seemed to have abandoned the tactics that had proven so successful against the English in the first six months of the Pequot War prior to Mistick Fort. Although the Pequot did try to lure or drive the English into ambush points along the way in order to fire their arrows at point blank range (generally less than 30 yards), they were so enraged by the

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deaths of more than 400 of their people at Mistick they would often venture into the open in an attempt to revenge the deaths of their comrades.  

The English Allied army was ferried to the west bank of the Thames and disembarked to spend the night on shore near their ships while the other vessels transported Underhill and the wounded to Saybrook Fort. The next morning Mason and the remaining English Allied forces marched twenty miles through Western Niantic territory, reaching the east bank of the Connecticut River on the evening of May 27, 1637. The English Allied forces encamped along the Connecticut River for the night and in the morning were transported over the river and to the safety of Saybrook Fort. The Mistick Campaign was over.

*Quinnipiac Campaign (July 7-14, 1637) and Fairfield Swamp Fight (July 13-14, 1637)*

On June 2, 1637, the Connecticut General Court authorized a second levy of troops to continue the war against the Pequot and Captain Mason was again put in command of a 30-man company.  Five days later on June 7, 1637, Plymouth Colony declared war on the Pequot and planned to raise fifty men for land and sea service, but these forces were never deployed. During this time Gardiner and his command shared Saybrook Fort with Captains Underhill and Patrick along with sixty Massachusetts Bay soldiers. There they awaited the arrival of Captain Israel Stoughton and an army of one hundred and twenty-men from Massachusetts Bay.

In the weeks following the destruction of Mistick Fort the remaining Pequot villages (estimated at 24 and upwards to 3,500 people) abandoned their territory for fear of additional attacks by the English. Sassacus and Mononotto, the remaining two chief sachems, elected to continue the war against the English and Narragansett. Sassacus, with five or six sachems and perhaps two hundred men, women, and children, made their way west along the Connecticut coast intending to seek refuge and support from their allies and tributaries to the west at Quinnipiac (New Haven), Cupheag (Stratford), Poquonnock (Bridgeport), Sasqua (Fairfield), and beyond to the Hudson River. Groups of Pequot made preparations to cross the Connecticut River a week or two after the Mistick Campaign to

36 Mason, *History of the Pequot War*. P. 11
seek safety with tributary allies to the west on their journey to enlist the aid of the Mohawk (Albany, New York) against the English.

Around the middle of June, Patrick reported the capture of “some Cannoes laden with all sorts of Indean howsell stuff passinge by the rivers mouth” although “Anonymous” provides a contradicting account in which “The English at Say-brook had notice of the Cannoos, and an advantage to stop their passage, but Capt. Patrick delayed until the opportunity was gone.”³⁹ This movement of canoes was interpreted by the English as evidence of Sassacus’ retreat. Around June 18, a shallop with three English soldiers sailing south towards Saybrook Fort was attacked in force by the Pequot at Six Mile Island.⁴⁰ After the Pequot killed the men and destroyed the vessel they continued to transport the rest of their people across the river.

The following day Captain Underhill and those men of his company “willing to returne to the Bay” departed Saybrook Fort after their three-month deployment.⁴¹ Captain Patrick was left in command of Massachusetts Bay forces until the arrival of Israel Stoughton around June 21, 1637. On June 26, 1636, the Connecticut General Court authorized a third levy of ten additional troops, which may have been sent to Saybrook Fort or added to Mason’s Connecticut Company. It was further ordered that “Mr. Haine & Mr. Ludlowe shall goe to the mouth of the River to treate & Conclude wth o‘ frendes of the Bay either to joine wth their forces in p‘secutingo‘ design against o‘ enemies or if they see cause by advise to interprise any Accon according to the force we have. And to parle wth the bay about o‘ settinge downe in the Pequoitt Countrey.”⁴² In a letter to Boston dated June 28, Stoughton noted that Ludlow, Mason, and thirty Connecticut men had arrived and that the combined forces planned to move against “Sasacos, and an other great Sagamore: Momomattuck.”⁴³

By late June 1637, the English Allied forces now consisted of approximately one hundred and sixty Massachusetts Bay soldiers, forty Connecticut troops, an undetermined number of Native allies, and at least three pinnaces and multiple shallops. For the

remainder of the Pequot War, Saybrook Fort acted primarily as the gateway to the Connecticut River and possibly as a warehousing or staging area for Connecticut forces on their way to Pequot Harbor. No attacks were reported around the vicinity of Saybrook Fort since the shallop attack of June 17 as the Pequot had completely vacated the region and the English prepared for a second and final campaign against Sassacus and Mononotto’s remaining men.

_The Massachusetts Bay Phase of the War and The Quinnipiac Campaign_

Massachusetts Bay quickly established a presence in Pequot country with Stoughton’s large force fortified on the Niantic side of Pequot Harbor and took control of the English war effort. Between June 28 and July 10, English, Narragansett, and Mohegan forces marched through Pequot country in search of refugees or resistance. The Narragansett surrounded about one hundred Pequot in a swamp twelve miles north of the Possession House which Captain Stoughton then captured. In early July, Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut English forces organized another campaign against the retreating Pequot. The force consisted of one hundred and sixty Massachusetts Bay and forty Connecticut soldiers and an unknown number of Mohegan and River Indians. At this time the Narragansett and Massachusetts Indian Allies refused to send any fighting men as they were angry with how they were treated by their Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay allies. According to Roger Williams, the Narragansett did send two men as guides for the campaign. The combined force embarked from Pequot Harbor, first sailing for Long Island in pursuit of Sassacus. English Allied forces landed on Long Island, west of Montauk, where they met with the sachems of the place. These people were likely Montauk Indians and were tributary and allied to the Pequot until the defeat of the Pequot at Mistick. These Native groups submitted to English authority and relayed that Sassacus was at Quinnipiac (New Haven). According to Lion Gardiner, one of the sachems’ sons, Wyandanch, and an unknown number of Long Island Indian warriors joined the English Allied forces and accompanied them on the campaign.

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44 Winthrop, _Winthrop’s Journal_. P. 1:225; Hubbard, _Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians_. P. 128.
45 LaFantasie, _Correspondence of Roger Williams_. P. 1:114.
46 Mason in Prince, _History of the Pequot War_. P. 15; Hubbard, _Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians_. P. 128.
47 Gardiner, _Relation of the Pequot Warres_. P. 22.
With new intelligence received from the Montauk and others, the English Allied army sailed west to Quinnipiac. The following day, English Allied forces came to a harbor ten miles east of New Haven (Quinnipiac) Harbor, at present-day Guilford. There, four Native allies disembarked and captured several Pequot, two of whom were sachems. After an unsuccessful interrogation the sachems were executed and their heads placed in a tree on the neck of land where they were taken. The place name of “Sachem’s Head” still exists today.\(^4\) The next day the ships continued west to Quinnipiac Harbor where they were drawn to the sight of smoke from fires. Allied Native forces scouted the area and determined that the Natives there were “Connecticut (allied) Indians” and not Pequot.\(^5\) They brought with them the son of a Quinnipiac sachem who promised to help the English locate any Pequot in the area but none were found.\(^6\) The next day, skeptical English commanders determined to scout the area themselves and a company under Lieutenant Richard Davenport captured seven Pequot, one of whom was a sachem. One of the captives forced to serve as a guide for the English “directed them into quite contrary way, for which his life was deservedly taken from him.”\(^7\)

Finding few Pequot around Quinnipiac, English Allied forces made landfall west of the Housatonic River and continued their western advance towards Poquonnock (present-day Stratford and Bridgeport). At this time a captive Pequot named Luz, who had been captured earlier in Pequot country and had promised to work for the English if he and his family were spared, was sent out on foot to Sassacus.\(^8\) It would be nearly a week before English commanders would hear back from him.

While Luz searched for Sassacus, English Allied forces split their companies into smaller units in order to cover more ground and to pursue multiple groups of Pequot they encountered. Before long they encountered scattered groups of Pequot as they advanced west but it is unclear how much fighting may have occurred during the English Allied advance. Thomas Stanton indicated in a 1659 court testimony concerning lands conquered by the English during the war, that English forces “ded persue y\(^{10}\) ye pequets” and “killed

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divers att new haven & att Cupheag,” Cupheag being the Native name for present-day Stratford, Connecticut.\(^{53}\) If this is the case, then it appears there were some skirmishes fought between Pequot Allied and English Allied forces beginning at Quinnipiac. Stanton further mentioned that “onely one house or yѣ carcass of one wee found att milford with out inhabitants att the Cutting of yѣ Pequots.”\(^{54}\)

During this time, the English spy Luz managed to find Sassacus and the largest group of Pequot in Sasqua country in present-day Fairfield. At some point Pequot leaders became suspicious of Luz who they believed to be a spy. Luz fled the camp with Pequot warriors in pursuit, but according to the Minister William Hubbard, “he accidently met with a Canooe a little before turned adrift” which he used to paddle away and was picked up by an English vessel.\(^{55}\) According to Captain Mason, the Anonymous account, and William Hubbard, it was Luz who then directed English commanders to proceed to Sasquannikut. Upon receiving this new intelligence Mason recalled how English Allied forces “then hastened our March towards the Place where the Enemy was.”\(^{56}\) On the morning of July 13, 1637, one English Allied company of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Native troops marching through Poquonnock encountered corn fields and cut them down, taking what corn they could.\(^{57}\) In the process they captured “a Pecott man very poore and weake” who told them of others nearby. Soon after, Allied Indians reported the cutting of wood in another direction, upon which English forces split their troops yet again.\(^{58}\) Mason reported that it was at these corn fields where “several of the English espied some Indians, who fled from them” and were closely pursued.\(^{59}\) A mixed company of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Native forces under the command of Captain John Mason crossed the Mill River in present-day Fairfield and climbed present day Mill Hill in Southport. Captain Mason recalled how the soldiers “coming to the Top of an Hill” were able to view the surrounding countryside and saw “several Wigwams” below them with “only a Swamp intervening, which was almost divided into two Parts.”\(^{60}\) According to Philip Vincent, this

\(^{54}\) Stanton, “1659 05 04 Testimony.”
\(^{55}\) Hubbard, Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians. P. 129.
\(^{56}\) Mason in Prince, History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
\(^{57}\) Winthrop, Winthrop Papers. III:453.
\(^{58}\) Winthrop, Winthrop Papers. III:453.
\(^{59}\) Mason in Prince, History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
\(^{60}\) Mason in Prince, History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
location was approximately “threescore miles beyond the Country (till within 36 miles of
the Dutch plantations on Hudsons river).”

_Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp_

The dwellings Mason saw to the south were part of a Sasqua village set near a large
wetland known by the local Native people as Munnacommock (roughly translated to
“refuge” and known today as the Pequot Swamp). In addition to the Sasqua Indians, there
were several dozen Pequot warriors and over 80 Pequot and Sasqua non-combatants in the
village as well as an unknown number of fighters from other local tribes still tributary or
allied to the Pequot, most notably the Poquonnock. Once they realized the English were
nearby they made the decision to flee into the swamp for safety and to mount a defense.
Not wanting to lose the element of surprise the English allied forces atop Mill Hill quickly
descended south to engage the enemy below. The first soldiers to reach the swamp, under
the command of Connecticut Sergeant Palmer, moved to “surround the smaller Part of the
Swamp” while a group of Massachusetts Bay soldiers under Lieutenant Davenport headed
directly to the village by charging into the swamp.

As Davenport’s file of a half dozen men entered the swamp he “overtook a man
and a sachem Child” who he killed with his half pike. The men pushed further into the
swamp when the last soldier in line, John Wedgwood, was shot in the stomach with an
arrow and was captured by Pequot warriors. Davenport and three other soldiers turned to
assist their comrade and were engaged by several additional warriors who shot at them
with arrows. One soldier, Thomas Sherman, was shot in the neck and fell while
Lieutenant Davenport was hit by fourteen arrows, two of which missed his armor and
pierced his body. Davenport managed to kill or wound four of the attackers and saved
Wedgwood in the process. The men were soon rescued by additional Massachusetts Bay
soldiers under Sergeant Riggs and the Pequot men broke off the fight. Soon after, the rest
of the English Allied army arrived and surrounded Munnacommock Swamp.

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61 Vincent, _A True Relation_. P. 16.
62 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume IX, 5th Series. Boston, MA: Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1885. P. 121.
63 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society. P. IX:121.
64 Mason in Prince, _History of the Pequot War_. P. 15.
65 Winthrop, _Winthrop Papers_. III:453.
66 Hubbard, _Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians_. P. 129.
It was around 3 p.m. when English commanders deliberated on how to best proceed with their siege. Captains Patrick and Traske of Massachusetts Bay wanted to cut down the swamp using “Indian Hatchets” they had captured, but this was opposed. Others suggested that they palisade the entire swamp but this was considered unrealistic. Some believed that there was time to charge the swamp but this too was rejected. Finally, English commanders considered tightening their siege while sealing open passages with brush to secure the swamp until the morning, but this course of action was not taken either. Captain Mason recalled that “so different were our Apprehensions” that the commanders could not agree on a course of action and some of the men simply “concluded the Indians would make an Escape in the Night.” In the end English Allied forces maintained their circumference of the swamp, but their soldiers and Native allies were spread thin which Mason described as “keeping at a great distance” apart. Edward Johnson described how “some of them spied an Indian with a kettle at his back going more inwardly into the swamp, by which they perceived there was some place of firm land in the midst thereof, which caused them to make way for the passage of their Souldiers.” To tighten the siege somewhat, Captain Mason ordered his troops to push through the narrow part of the swamp and the firm land described by Johnson, in order to cut the swamp in two which was accomplished by Sergeant Davis.

As the afternoon wore on English Allied forces engaged an undetermined number of Pequot men and their allies who fought back from the cover and protection of the swamp. The English estimated that they faced 70 or 80 warriors but were unsure of the total number. According to Edward Johnson, the Pequot forces maintained contact with the English “and as they saw opportunity they made shot with their Arrowes at the English.” When English troops returned fire those Pequot warriors “then suddenly they would fall flat along the water to defend themselves from the retaliation of the Souldiers Muskets.” The “Anonymous” account described how “the English beset the Swamp; and shot in upon

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67 Mason in Prince, History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
69 Mason in Prince, History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
them” but also mentions that in this engagement the Pequot shot back with their own firearms as “some of which were furnished with Guns.”72

After sustained fighting the English allowed Native non-combatants to surrender and made it clear that they only wanted the remaining Pequot warriors. Nearly a hundred Pequot, Sasqua, and Poquonnock Indians surrendered but the fighting soon continued.73 The English Allied force was not sufficient to prevent Pequot fighters from escaping the swamp and they proceeded to cut the swamp in half to more effectively surround it and contain the remaining defenders inside. What followed was an overnight battle as the English tried to keep the remaining Pequot men hemmed in the swamp and the Pequot and allied fighters attempted to break through the English lines and escape. The following morning of July 14, under cover of fog, approximately sixty to eighty Pequot men broke through a section of the English lines and escaped. They did so by feigning a major attack on Captain Patrick’s section of the line. When the English commanders sent their men to reinforce Patrick’s company large gaps opened in the English line which allowed the vast majority of Pequot warriors to escape the swamp.74 English accounts of Pequot casualties differ, ranging from seven dead to as many as sixty.75 The earliest, and possibly the most accurate, accounting of Pequot casualties comes from the “Anonymous” account which claims that a “Diligent search was the next day made in the Swamp for dead Indians, Not many, (as some have made Narration) but seven, and no more could be found.”76 As later narratives of the war were published in the decades that followed, the alleged Pequot body count following the battle became drastically inflated. The English suffered a handful of wounded during the battle.77 Other than the initial casualties incurred in Lieutenant Davenport’s squad, “Anonymous” reported that “although the Indians coming up close to our men, shot their Arrows thick upon them, as to pierce their hat brims, and their Sleeves, and Stockings, and other parts of their Cloaths, yet so miraculously did the Lord preserve

73 All of those surrenders were sold into slavery either in the New England Colonies or to islands in the Caribbean. Pequot women and children of note in particular were sold into Caribbean slavery. Massachusetts Bay traders sent south to sell Indian captives often returned with African slaves. The African slave trade in New England is rooted in the Pequot War.
them, as that (excepting three that rashly ventured into the Swamp after them) not one of them was wounded.”

After the battle the English were informed that they had missed capturing Sassacus and other Pequot leaders by a day. Sassacus along with six other sachems, a few women, and a body guard of twenty men had left the main Pequot body at Quinnipiac after suspecting their kinsman Luz of spying. Sassacus’ group moved north along Housatonic River and west up the Ten Mile River into present-day eastern New York with the intention of seeking refuge in Mohawk territory. The Pequot were discovered by a contingent of Mahican or Mohawk warriors near the “Stone Church” in Dover Plains, New York. Sassacus’s party was surprised in their wigwams by their attackers. Sassacus was killed in the engagement and although some of the Pequot managed to escape they were quickly found and executed. The Mohawk sent Sassacus’s head and hands to Agawam (Springfield, MA) where they were sent downriver to Hartford before reaching Boston on August 5, 1637. The death of Sassacus effectively ended all Pequot resistance.

Treaty of Hartford (September 21, 1638)

The Pequot War ended where it began, on Block Island. On August 1, 1637, Stoughton, based in occupied Pequot country to pursue refugee bands of Pequot, sailed to Block Island with a small force to seek satisfaction from the Manisses. Stoughton and his men killed an unknown number of several Manisses and burned several wigwams before the Manisseans submitted to English authority. The Treaty of Hartford was signed on September 21, 1638, between the English of Connecticut, and their Native allies during the war; some of whom include Uncas the Mohegan sachem, and the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi (Narragansett) along with English leaders John Haynes, Roger Ludlow, and Edward Hopkins. Over the course of the war, hundreds of Pequot lost their lives; dozens of Pequot men and sachems were executed. Captured Pequot women and children were given to colonists as spoils of war or placed in captivity under other tribes who had pledged allegiance to the English. Women and children of high social standing were sold into slavery to Pequot settlements in the Caribbean.

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IV. Order of Battle, Weaponry, and Tactics

Pequot Order of Battle

Pequot Allied Forces at Munnacommock Swamp (July 13-14, 1637)

- Pequot (Approximately 70-80)
- Poquonnock (Unknown)
- Sasqua (Unknown)

At the time of the Pequot War, the Pequot tribe could field approximately 1,000 fighting men, not counting those of their tributaries and allies. Following the English Allied victory at Mistick Fort the Pequot Confederacy of tributary tribes soon collapsed. The Pequot were not able to maintain political or military control over many of their former tributaries such as the Wangunk and the Montauk. The closest of the Pequot allies, including the Western Niantic and several Nipmuc groups, remained military allies during this time but the ability for Pequot leaders to raise hundreds of warriors was seriously diminished. The significant loss of several hundred warriors during the Battles of Mistick Fort and the English Withdrawal greatly impacted their ability to successfully prosecute the war. By early July 1637, it appears that Sassacus was only able to muster around 100 warriors during his trek west along the Connecticut Coast. Although Sassacus and his followers were able to rely on the hospitality and provisions from some western Connecticut allies, such as the Quinnipiac, Poquonnock, and Sasqua, those tribes do not seem to have contributed many fighting men to Sassacus’ remaining forces.

Pequot Armament & Tactics

By the time of the Pequot-Dutch War (1634), the Pequot may have acquired some guns through trade from the Dutch and perhaps a few taken from Captain Stone and his crew. When the Pequot War commenced, the Pequot well understood the capabilities of European firearms and armor and the effectiveness of European battle formations against Native formations in the open field. The Pequot quickly adjusted their tactics to counter the superiority of English firearms and minimize European material advantages while maximizing their own tactics and weaponry. When the Pequot War began in late 1636, the English were quickly introduced to Native tactics that relied on small groups of men who stayed a sufficient distance from English firearms and only hazarded themselves in groups...
of ten to quickly shoot a volley of arrows. The Pequot also devised ways to get close enough to the English (while not injuring themselves) to fire their arrows with enough accuracy to find the weak spots in English armor – usually the head, neck, shoulders, arms, and legs. By using natural cover and camouflage from the local environment Pequot warriors would try to fire on English forces at close range, or draw them into an ambush, to ensure they hit unarmored portions of their targets. The Pequot employed a number of strategies to bring the English close enough to mitigate their superior long-range firepower including flank and rear attacks, ruses, feints, and ambushes.

The leadership structure and organization of individuals and units in the Pequot military system are not well understood. There are frequent references to groups of ten Pequot shooting arrows and then falling back to make room for another group of ten bowmen.\(^{82}\) This pattern suggests at the time of the war the basic unit of the Pequot military organization were groups of ten men, presumably with appropriate leadership at that level. When these smaller groups of ten were integrated into larger units, perhaps 50 to 100 men (or more), they were led by “Captains.” Captains were not sachems or men of high social standing, but individuals respected for their knowledge and leadership, as well as their bravery and success in battle. Above the Captain(s), it appears a sachem was in overall command of a large formation of warriors and often fought alongside his men in battle. The English mention two sachems killed at Mistick Fort on May 26, 1637. One was Momoho, the sachem of Mistick, and the second (unnamed) likely led the 100 to 150 warriors who were sent to Mistick the night before. Weinshauks, Sassacus’ fort, served as an important logistical and command location during the Battles of Mistick and the English Withdrawal.

Van Der Donck made the following observations regarding military structure, tactics, and combat among Natives living along the Hudson River which may be relevant to the demonstrated military experience and organization of the Pequot:

The principal order, authority, and structure of command of the Indians is revealed in time of war and matters pertaining to war, but it is not so firm that they can maintain platoons, companies, and regiments whenever they wish. They march in separate files and out of step, even when in their best formation. They attack furiously, are merciless in victory, and cunning in planning an assault. If it is a dangerous one, they operate by stealth, very

\(^{82}\) One such instance was recorded by John Winthrop. See: Hosmer. *Winthrop’s Journal.* P. I:191; John Underhill also alludes to such tactics. See: Underhill. *Newes From America.* Pp. 40-41.
quietly, and under cover of darkness. They will always attempt to ambush and deceive the enemy, but face to face on a plain or water they are not particularly combative and tend to flee in good time, unless they are besieged, when they fight stubbornly to the last man as long as they can stand up.  

At the time of the Pequot War, Sassacus was the principle Pequot Sachem but the English were equally concerned about a sachem named Momomattuck. Other military leaders were known as “Pniese.” These men were groomed for military leadership when they were very young, and often served as military advisors to the chief sachem. Edward Winslow, writing in 1623, described the Pniese he encountered in New England:

The pnieses are men of great courage and wisdom, and to those also the devil appeareth more familiarly than to others, and as we conceive, maketh covenant with them to preserve them from death by wounds with arrows, knives, hatchets, &c…yet they are known by their courage and boldness, by reason whereof one of them will chase almost an hundred men; for they account it death for whomsoever stand in their way. These are highly esteemed of all sorts of people, and are of the sachim’s council, without whom they will not war, or undertake any weighty business. In war their sachims, for their more safety, go in the midst of them. They are commonly men of the greatest stature and strength, and such as will endure most hardness, and yet are more discreet, courteous and humane in their carriages than any amongst them, scorning theft, lying and the like base dealings, and stand as much upon their reputation as any men.

Pequot tactics against English forces varied upon the situation, but it is evident that the Pequot modified their military tactics based on their combat experience against the Dutch and later the English during the Siege of Saybrook. By this time Pequot warriors had learned not to engage the Europeans in open field but learned to stay out of musket range (approximately 125-175 yards) until an opportunity presented itself through feint, ruse, or ambush to get close enough to the English to fire their arrows point blank (less than 30 yards), and with few exceptions in smaller groups of five to 15 warriors. This tactic presented the English with a smaller target and allowed the Pequot to maximize the effectiveness of their arrows. Pequot fighters used the terrain and cover to their advantage to observe the unsuspecting English before they attacked and generally remain out of

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83 Van Der Donck, New Netherland. P. 100.
musket range or pressed the attack so closely it negated the English advantage in firearms. The Pequot proved themselves very capable of launching organized close-range attacks on English forces in order to overpower slow-loading English musketeers. In any case, the Pequot tactics ranged from ambushes and sharp skirmishes to pitched battles at close quarters as described by an amazed Lieut. Gardiner who recalled Pequot adversaries who charged “to very muzzles of our pieces (muskets).”

**Edged Weaponry:** Pequot men were armed with a number of weapons. Most men carried edged weapons of various types to use in close-combat. Edged weapons known or presumed to have been used by the Pequot include iron knives, iron axes, and stone celts hafted in wooden handles. Edward Johnson described how “the most of them were armed also with a small Hatchet on a long handle” and also mentioned “they had a small number of Mawhawkes, Hammers, which are made of stone, having a long pike on the one side, and a hole in the handle, which they tie about their wrists.”

![Monolithic Axe collected in Branford, CT.](figure4)

The type of weapon referred to by Johnson as “a small Hatchet on a long handle” is likely a European trade axe. The “Mowhawkes, Hammers” he describes are monolithic stone axes similar to the one collected in Branford, Connecticut (Figure 4). The axe is made from a Greywacke found in the Albany, New York area (Mohawk territory). Greywacke is a variety of metamorphosed sandstone characterized by its hardness, dark

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color, and poorly sorted angular grains. The form of the monolithic axe is derived from a hafted celt, commonly used as a woodworking tool or weapon of war. A number of monolithic axes have been recovered from Mississippian burial mounds, always in association with warriors of high social status. The monolithic axe recovered from Branford, Connecticut portrays several beings carved into the axe, a bird of prey for the handle, an owl facing away from the user and toward an enemy, and the image of a male/warrior facing the user. Five pieces of shell were at one time glued to each side of the axe, and two more into the eyes of the owl. The upper half of the axe was painted with vermillion, a brilliant Chinese red ochre mixed with mercury, a common trade item in the seventeenth century. The vermillion indicates the object dates to the seventeenth century, and its provenience suggests it may be associated with the Pequot. If so, the axe was carried by someone of rank or standing, perhaps a sachem, war captain, or powwow (i.e., a Native healer). Such signifiers of potential military rank or leadership may provide some insights into the military organization of the Pequot.88

**Pole Arm Weaponry:** The Pequot used spears of varying lengths during the war resembling pikes or javelins. Vincent stated Pequot men carried “Javelins, &c.”89 His reference to a javelin suggests a weapon thrown at the enemy. Thrusting spears were also carried by “Captains” and used in close-quarter combat.

**Projectile Weaponry:** The bow, with brass tipped arrows, was the primary weapon used by the Pequot in open battle. The earliest arrows described by the English at Plymouth “were headed with brass, others with hart’s horn, and others with eagles’ claws.”90 By the time of the Pequot War, Native arrows tipped with brass points cut from sheet brass or brass kettles were used exclusively. Just before the English Allied Force departed Saybrook Fort to attack the Pequot, the English prevented a Dutch ship from trading with the Pequot because they might “go and trade with them our enemies, with such commodities as might be prejudicial unto us, and advantageous to them, as kettles, or the like, which make them Arrow heads.”91

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Brass points quickly replaced stone and bone points because they were likely easier to produce given sufficient supplies of raw materials, not because they had superior penetrating power. Several of the brass arrow points recovered from Mistick Fort were bent from impacting English armor or buff coats, something that would not happen to stone or bone/antler points although neither material would be able to penetrate iron armor or very thick buff coats.

Figure 5. Conical and Flat Cuprous Points Recovered from the Mistick Fort Site.

The brass points used by Pequot bowmen were easily able to penetrate English clothing and would be stopped by heavy English buff coats which they could somewhat penetrate. They were completely ineffective against English iron armor. The brass arrow points used by Native bowmen were of two types: flat, two dimensional triangular points, and rolled conical points. Within the flat group are many variations of triangular shape, with or without flared “barbs” at the base. The rolled conical points were generally six inches long and rolled to a fine, needle-like point and sometimes had three-dimensional “barbs” or flares at their base (Figure 5).

The Algonquian bow was very effective at a distance of 20-40 yards, and had a maximum range of 120-150 yards if shot at a 45 degree angle. A Native bowman could

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fire up to a dozen arrows a minute. The only surviving example of a southern New England bow was acquired by William Goodnough, an English farmer in Sudbury, Massachusetts, who killed the bow’s owner in 1660 for ransacking Goodnough’s house for plunder. The bow is now in the collections of Harvard University. The “Sudbury Bow” is made of hickory and is 67 inches long (5.6 feet).\(^93\) No two bows were exactly alike as each one was made to match the height of the user. There are many English references to the penetrating power and accuracy of Native bows. During the English attack on Block Island, one English captain “received a shot upon the breast of his Corset, as if it had beene pushed with a pike, and if hee had not had it on, hee had lost his life.”\(^94\) In an attack on Gardiner and some of his men during the Siege of Saybrook, Gardiner was wounded by a Native arrow through his buff coat, and “…the body of one man shot through, the arrow going in at the right side, the head sticking fast, half through a rib on the right side.” Gardiner “took out and cleansed it, and presumed to send to the Bay, because they had said that the arrows of the Indians were of no force.”\(^95\)

The Pequot and other Native people in southern New England began to acquire firearms from the Dutch years before the English arrived in the Connecticut Valley. During the siege of Saybrook Fort, the English reported the Pequot captured a number of guns from the soldiers and traders they killed at the fort and along the Connecticut River. The two Swaine girls captured at Wethersfield and brought to Pequot territory reported that the Pequot had 16 firearms. The figure is a conservative estimate, as the girls counted only those firearms they encountered during their two-week stay in Pequot country. Interestingly, Edward Johnson stated the reason the Pequot took the two girls captive was in the hope they knew how to make gunpowder.\(^96\) If true, it suggests the Pequot were familiar with firearms but found it difficult to procure gunpowder.

The Pequot began to use firearms with increasing regularity against the English during the siege of Saybrook Fort according to Lieutenant Gardiner:

> the Indians are many hundreds of both sides the rier and shoote at our Pinaces as they goe vp and downe; for they furnish the Indians with peeces

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\(^94\) Underhill, Newes From America. P. 7.
\(^96\) Johnson, Wonder-working Providence. P. 117.
powder and shot, and they come many times and shoot our owne pieces at vs, they haue 3 from vs already, 5 of Capt: Stones one of Charles.\textsuperscript{97}

The Pequot may have been very selective about the firearms they acquired through purchase or capture, preferring lighter carbines and muskets over heavier matchlocks, flintlocks, and “long guns.” In February 1637, Gardiner took ten men to burn “weeds, leaves and reeds, upon the neck of land” when they were attacked by numerous Pequot hiding in the marshes. In their fighting retreat to Saybrook Fort, two of Gardiner’s men threw away their firearms. Several days later Gardiner “found ye guns y\textsuperscript{e} weare throne away.”\textsuperscript{98} If the Pequot were interested in acquiring English firearms it is strange they would not have pick up discarded English firearms on ground they had won and controlled for a number of days. It may well be the firearms were rejected by the Pequot because they were unwieldy matchlocks or heavy flintlocks.

A 1640’s description by Dutch colonist Adriaen Van Der Donck of the weapons used by Native men inhabiting the lower Hudson River Valley may have relevance to the weapons used during the Pequot War and insights into the evolution of Native arms and warfare during this period:

Their weapons used to be, always and everywhere, bow and arrow, a war club on the arm and, hanging from the shoulder, a shield big enough to cover the trunk up to the shoulders. They paint and make up their faces in such a manner that they are barely recognizable, even to those who know them well. Then they tie a strap or snakeskin around the head, fix a wolf’s or a fox’s tail upright on top, and stride imperiously like a peacock. Nowadays they make much use in their warfare of flintlock guns, which they learn to handle well, have a great liking for, and spare no money to buy in quantity at high prices from the Christians. With it they carry a light ax in place of the war club, and so they march off.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{English Allied Order of Battle}

\textbf{English Allied Forces} (July 13-14, 1637)

\textbf{English Forces} (Approximately 160)
- Massachusetts Bay (120 Soldiers)
- Connecticut (40 Soldiers)

\textsuperscript{97} Winthrop, \textit{Winthrop's Journal}. P. III: 321.
\textsuperscript{98} Gardiner, \textit{Relation of the Pequot Warres}. P. 13.
Allied Native Forces – (Unknown)
Long Island Indians (Unknown)
Mohegan (Unknown)
Narragansett (2 Guides)
“River Indians” Eg: Suckiaug, Wangunk, Poquonnock, etc. (Unknown)
Pequot (Wequash – 1 Scout / Guide)

English Forces

Following the English Allied victories at the Battles of Mistick Fort and the English Withdrawal, the majority of the Connecticut army was demobilized and sent back home to their towns on the Connecticut River. Captain Mason was left in charge of a small company of about twenty men who were stationed at Saybrook Fort. Massachusetts Bay sent an army of 140 soldiers under the command of Captain Patrick to take possession of Pequot country near present-day New London on the west side of the Thames (Pequot) River. Patrick constructed a block house or palisade where he directed the operations to track down the remnant Pequot communities. When the Quinnipiac Campaign was organized it appears that the combined force consisted of approximately one hundred and sixty Massachusetts Bay soldiers, forty Connecticut troops, and an undetermined number of Native allies.

English Military Experience

The level of training and experience among the English forces who participated in the Mistick Campaign varied from draftee to veteran soldier. It is certain that the English forces were far more than a collection of inexperienced farmers as they are often depicted. An undetermined number of English settlers in the Connecticut River Valley and Massachusetts Bay (perhaps as many as 20-25%) had prior military service either in European wars, privateering in the Caribbean, or against the Powhatan Confederacy in Virginia. Of the thousands of English settlers who had converged on New England between 1620 and 1636, a handful can be confirmed as having prior military service during the Thirty Years War in Europe. Although it is unclear how many English colonists in New England had prior military service in the lowlands of Europe, hundreds of English and Scots served in the Thirty Years War and later migrated to the colonies. Between 1629 and 1635, Puritan officials such as John Winthrop, John Davenport, and Hugh Peters actively sought veteran soldiers, armorers, artillerists, and engineers for the defense of their Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut settlements. They were able to recruit veterans of the
Low Country Wars in both England and the United Provinces. ¹⁰⁰ This included John Mason, John Underhill, and Daniel Patrick, all of whom arrived in Massachusetts Bay between 1630 and 1632.¹⁰¹ It is believed that all officers and non-commissioned officers in the Pequot War had prior military service.

**English Armament and Tactics**

The first English colonists to settle Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay, and later Connecticut provided themselves with modern European military equipment and weaponry. The organizers of the various English colonial ventures perceived threats from the Native inhabitants of the region, the Dutch in New Netherland (who laid claim to lands as far east as Narragansett Bay), and even the English Crown. Once the English established a presence in New England, they turned to building defensive fortifications and sought both ordnance and small arms to defend against indigenous and European threats. Plymouth Colony and Massachusetts initially trained their militias to defend against European foes by instructing men in the use of both the musket and pike, but colonial arms, armor, and tactics soon evolved to combat more immediate Native threats.

Colonial leadership went to different lengths to arm their respective colonies. The first English settlers from the Plymouth Company provided some matchlock arms and armor for their settlers. Even though Plymouth Colony provided some arms, colonial leaders began to rely less on public weapon stores and encouraged private individuals to purchase their arms. In 1621, Edward Winslow recommended the following to the prospective Plymouth immigrant: “Bring every man a musket or fowling piece. Let your piece be long in the barrel; and fear not the weight of it, for most of our shooting is from stands…Let your shot be most for big fowls, and bring store of powder and shot”¹⁰² The

fowling piece was a multifaceted arm which was effective in hunting and could also serve as a weapon. However, heavy long-barreled weapons quickly began to be replaced in favor of shorter barreled and lighter weapons such as carbines and bastard muskets which were easier to load and wield in the wooded terrain of the New World.

80 bastard musketts, wth snaphaunces, 4 foote in the barrill, without rests ;
06 longe fowlinge peeces wth muskett boare, 6 foote longe, ½;
4 longe fowlinge peeces, wth bastard musket boare, 5 1/2 foote longe;
10 full musketts, 4 foote barrill, wth matchcocks and rests;
90 bandeleeres, for the musketts, each wth bullett bag;
10 horne flaskes, for the longe fowlinge peeces, to hould a 1 pheece; &
100 swords * belts;
60 cosletts [corselets], & 60 pikes; 20 halffe pikes

As early as 1628 English colonists recognized the superiority of flintlock and lighter weapons over matchlock weapons but nonetheless continued to value matchlocks in certain circumstances.

The Massachusetts Bay Colony was settled nearly a decade after Plymouth Colony as a joint-stock venture, and the company took steps to purchase stores of public arms as indicated in the Massachusetts Bay charter: “it shall be lawfull and free” for individuals in “our realms or dominions whatsoever to take, leade, carry, and transport…armour, weapons, ordinance, muncion, powder, shott…and all other things necessarie for the saide plantacon, and for their use and defence.” Like Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay eventually placed the burden of obtaining arms and equipment on the settlers themselves as indicated in early General Court orders.

When Massachusetts Bay settlers began to migrate to the Connecticut River Valley around 1633, the arms and equipment they brought with them were no different than what the Puritans who arrived in New England brought with them. It does not appear that any public stores of weapons were distributed to those who removed to the newly established Connecticut River towns, the migrants being expected to furnish their own personal weapons and armor. On the other hand, the English fort at Saybrook Point was purposely built as a military installation. Gardiner did receive some military equipment in the form of a few pieces of ordnance from Boston in 1636 and may have received a shipment of “two case of pistols, 6 carabines, and 10 half pickes” from George Fenwick, one of the

Saybrook proprietors, in May 1636.\textsuperscript{104} Some of the personal weapons and armor available at Saybrook Fort may have been privately supplied by the garrison itself or may have been additional public arms from Massachusetts Bay.

Some English settlers brought some of the most modern weapons and armor that they could afford while others purchased more antiquated arms. To the English settler and Puritan lawmaker the definition of “completely armed” by the time of the Pequot War meant being armed with both firearm and sword. The individual settler does not seem to have been expected to provide armor but nonetheless it appears that many individuals did bring some pieces of armor with them. The English forces from Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay and Saybrook Fort who took part in the Mistick Campaign were generally well armed and with a wide variety of arms and equipment, of civilian make as well as military.

\textbf{Armor:} During the mid-seventeenth century, European armor used in New England included an iron corselet (iron breast and backplate sometimes equipped with tassets to protect the upper legs in pikeman’s armor), a leather buff-coat (a thick leather jacket which provided protection against sword slashes and Native arrow fire) or “Jacks of plate” (small iron squares sewn between canvas or leather), and helmets.\textsuperscript{105} The iron corselet was the heaviest of the armor and offered the most effective protection against Native arrow fire, but offered no protection against large caliber firearms. Perhaps more importantly, given the enemy the English were about to fight, armor limited the wearer’s maneuverability and speed. The corselet with a tassett was the armor issued to European pikemen. A complete set consisted of a breastplate, backplate, two tassets to protect the legs above the knee, a gorget to protect the neck, and a helmet.\textsuperscript{106} This armor was commonly used by nearly all seventeenth century European armies, was easily acquired, and accompanied many English settlers to New England. Parts of this ensemble may have been discarded for the Mistick Campaign to save weight and gain maneuverability.

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Iron helmets were commonly carried by English settlers to New England and numerous forms manufactured by various European nations were widely available. Of the examples of seventeenth century iron helmets to survive in New England the most common forms of helmets are generally referred to as the pikeman’s helmet, the trooper’s helmet and the cabasset or morion. The pikeman’s helmet was a standard issue piece of equipment which had a wide brim turned down on the sides, and when combined with the corslet constituted a completed set of pikeman’s armor. The trooper’s helmet, or horseman’s helmet, consisted of an iron skull which covered most of the soldiers’ head, with a neck guard running off the back of the skull and a pivoted visor often equipped with a barred face guard. Finally, the cabasset or morion in its most common form was shaped as a deep bowl with an elongated comb along the crest of the helmet with a broad brim turned down to the front and back to protect from sword blows. The cabasset or morion became a popular infantry helmet and saw service in the English colonies.107

The leather buff-coat was another common form of armor worn by English forces. This heavy leather coat was optimally worn under iron armor but alone a well-made buff coat was capable of absorbing a sword cut or slowing an arrow fired by a Native bowman. The drawback of the buff coat in Europe was its high cost due to the thickness of leather and the amount of workmanship involved in its construction.108 Buff coats could have been produced in New England as well. There are numerous period accounts of English forces armed with buff coats during the Pequot War which saved the lives of many of the men who wore them. The use of “Jacks of plate” by Connecticut or Massachusetts Bay forces cannot be confirmed and the earliest reference to such a garment may be found in 1645 when the Connecticut General Court ordered that settlers obtain “a canvas coat quilted with cotton wool as defense against arrows.”109 Early on during the Pequot War it appears that some English settlers equipped themselves in a full corselet complete with tassets however, by the time of the Quinnipiac Campaign, English soldiers relied on breast and backplates only while others chose to wear only a buff coat.110

109 Peterson, Arms and Armor in Colonial America. P. 143.
110 In his journal, John Winthrop described how one armored Saybrook soldier was shot in the leg and wounded. See: Hosmer. Winthrop’s Journal. P. 191. Captain John Underhill also describes his twenty man
Edged Weaponry: It was commonplace for seventeenth century European soldiers to carry both swords and knives. All of the seventeenth century primary accounts of English forces during the Battle of Mistick Fort and subsequent engagements describe a heavy reliance on swords. A wide variety of European swords were brought to New England and they generally fall into three categories; rapiers, single-edged cutting swords, and double-edged broadswords. The main difference in the weapons is in the blade design. Daggers, knives, and early plug bayonets were likely carried by well-armed English settlers in New England. As early as 1618 “Daggers” were among the edged weapons on hand at “Smythe’s Hundred” in Virginia, but at another military muster in 1625 only two daggers were listed. The dagger or knife remained a popular weapon, but by the time of the Pequot War hatchets may have become a practical substitute for some edged sidearms.

Pole Arm Weaponry: English forces utilized pole arm weaponry during the Mistick Fort Campaign and later during the Quinnipiac Campaign, but not in large numbers as they did with firearm weaponry. The three main pole arms used by Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay forces were the pike (or half pike), the halberd, and the partisan. The pike was the longest of the pole arm and the typical European pike averaged between 15-18 feet in length, was made of a one-inch diameter ashwood pole which was fitted with sharp, iron pike head and an iron tip at the base. The pike head was fitted to the shaft by to long iron straps riveted to the wooded pole. At the time of the Pequot War, pikemen formed one third of Massachusetts Bay’s militia forces. It is not known if any full pikes were carried by English forces but months later during the Quinnipiac Campaign Lieutenant Davenport of Massachusetts Bay mentioned that he was armed with a “halfpike” which was six to eight feet in length. English colonists quickly adopted the practice of cutting full pikes into half-pikes following the Mistick Campaign.

Both the halberd and partisan were not only effective pole weapons but were also used to signify non-commissioned ranks such as sergeants. The halberd was on average eight to eleven feet in length. It had an iron or brass cap on the base and was headed with company as being “completely armed with Corslets…” which would contain a backplate, breastplate, and tassets. See: Underhill, Newes From America. P. 17.

112 Peterson, Arms and Armor in Colonial America. Pp. 87-89.
a piece that resembled a cross between an axe head and a long pike, which was also attached with long, riveted iron straps. One primary account of the attack on Mistick Fort clearly states that one English militiaman used a halberd in combat. The partisan was of similar length with a flatter, spear shaped head, with two upturned flukes at the base of the blade which was designed to catch and cut the leather straps of a horseman’s saddle. By the time of the English Civil War, partisans were carried by lieutenants. This practice is also reflected in the records of Massachusetts Bay which indicated the existence of “2 partizans, for capten & lieutenant.” Like the half-pike, a halberd or partisan may have been a preferred pole arm due to the overall length of the weapons (8 to 11 feet), which could also be shortened based on the preference of the user.

**Projectile Weaponry:** It is well known that English forces relied heavily on firearm weaponry during the Quinnipiac Campaign, but it is not clear what types of firearms English forces carried and in what proportion. Based on both primary accounts and archeological evidence it can be determined that English forces carried matchlock, wheellock, and flintlock weapons. It can also be inferred with various degrees of confidence that a wide variety of firearms were carried by English Allied Forces, including full-sized muskets, caliver-sized weapons, fowling muskets, carbines, pistols, as well as other firearms shortened or otherwise modified by their owner. The firearms carried by English Allied forces varied in firing mechanism, country of manufacture, classification, overall length and caliber.

The majority of English settlers in the Connecticut River valley may have been armed with matchlock firearms as indicated in a March 1638 order from the General Court at Hartford. The Court ordered that “every military man is to have continually in his house in a readiness halfe a pounde of goode powder, 2lb of bullets sutable to his peece, one pounde of match if his peece be a match locke.” This record indicates not only the presence of matchlocks but other types of firearms such as the snaphaunce or other early English flintlock designs, the dominant military arm in English colonies at the time. Colonial militias and soldiers are generally believed to have been primarily armed with matchlock arms prior to King Philips War (1675-1677), but this was clearly not the case in

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Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut. Based on the 1628 arms shipment to Massachusetts Bay, 80% of the firearms were flintlocks. Underhill’s description of the attack on Mistick Fort indicate both matchlock and snaphaunce arms were used, as well as musket and carbine length firearms:\textsuperscript{118}

souldiers so unexpert in the use of their armes, should give so compleat a volley, as though the finger of God had touched both match and flint...having our swords in our right hand, our Carbins or Muskets in our left hand.

The pistol was considered a close-quarters weapon which would be able to hit an individual target up to 35 meters away, therefore was typically fired at close range, and it was also a common practice to load a pistol with two lead balls at once.\textsuperscript{119} Pistols were popular weapons among settlers throughout the European colonies and were known to be carried by some English soldiers such as Lion Gardiner and John Underhill.

Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay soldiers were supplied with two types of ammunition: round ball and “small shot.” Since all firearms in the colonies were smoothbore weapons they proved versatile enough to accept these different ammunition loads. Round ball ammunition was a single round ball cast slightly smaller than the diameter of the musket bore while “small shot” consisted of small lead bullets or pellets analogous to modern day “buck shot.” Connecticut forces were ordered to carry 20 “bullets” and four pounds of shot, which would allow their musketeers to effectively fire at both distance targets or at point-blank range. A trained soldier could properly load and fire his arm once or twice per minute, but fouling from black powder residue would significantly reduce loading time in combat conditions. Measures could be taken to somewhat increase the rate of musket fire by carrying round ball ammunition in a soldier’s mouth, by utilizing undersized ammunition to reduce friction while loading, or even avoiding use of the ramrod by dropping an undersized ball down the barrel and slamming the butt of the musket on the ground loosely seating the round. Even so, it would be difficult to fire more than two or three rounds a minute under combat conditions.

European regulations (such as those issued by the States General in 1599) claimed that muskets and calivers were designed to fire at ranges of up to 328 and 219 yards

\textsuperscript{118} Underhill, \textit{Newes From America}. P. 34.

\textsuperscript{119} A pistol recovered at Jamestown was found to be loaded with two pistol balls. Straube, “‘Unfitt for any modern service’?” P. 57.
respectively but this likely referred to the maximum effective range of the weapons if fired at massed formation of men on an open European battlefield.\textsuperscript{120} English forces during the Pequot War did not fire at such great distances nor did they often have the chance to shoot at massed Native forces. It is unlikely that English forces accurately fired round ball ammunition out of smoothbore muskets at distances greater than 200 yards and most commonly fired at targets at about 100 – 130 yards. In good conditions all English smoothbore weapons, with the exception of pistols, could accurately hit a man sized target at a distance of 50-75 yards with round ball ammunition. Typically English forces had no choice but to engage more mobile Pequot warriors outside of smoothbore range (in excess of 100 yards) and often found it difficult to find their mark.

Small-shot ammunition loads were devastating at point-blank range (5-40 yards) but would have been become increasingly ineffective at ranges beyond fifty yards. The actual amount of projectiles contained in a small-shot charge varied between individuals, but loads could range from a few carbine or pistol caliber balls (between two and three .48-.57 inch diameter balls), to ten or more smaller pellets (“small shot” or “swan-shot”) (.20-.40 inch diameter balls), or any combination of shot smaller than a full sized musket ball. Captain Mason described the use of small-shot by the men under their command when he clearly stated that his men “repayed” Pequot bowmen “with our small Shot.”\textsuperscript{121} Months later during the Quinnipiac Campaign, Mason recalled a point during the Battle of Munnacommock Swamp where “the Indians were forcing out upon us” and at that close range his men “sent them back by our small Shot.”\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{Tactics:} The first action of the Pequot War occurred in August of 1636 as Captain John Endicott lead 100 Massachusetts Bay troops on a punitive expedition against Block Island and shortly after Pequot and Western Niantic villages on the Pequot [Thames] River.\textsuperscript{123} During this first engagement of the war Endicott’s forces employed European derived tactics which reflected the training the soldiers received in Massachusetts Bay. As early as 1631 Massachusetts Bay required all men of military age to assemble on a monthly basis in the local “traine band” and were drilled in a European fashion. Two-thirds of the men in the three main Massachusetts Bay traine bands were trained as musketeers and one

\textsuperscript{121} Mason, \textit{A Brief History of the Pequot War}. P. 9.
\textsuperscript{122} Mason, \textit{A Brief History of the Pequot War}. P. 17.
\textsuperscript{123} Underhill claims 100 while Winthrop states 90. See: Underhill, \textit{Newes From America}. P. 3.
third as pikemen.\textsuperscript{124} Captain John Underhill, one of three captains, commanded a company of men throughout the Punitive Expedition and described an organized and well trained group of soldiers who attempted to use European tactics against the Manisseans, Pequot, and Western Niantic with little luck. Once on Block Island Underhill described how Massachusetts Bay commanders believed that the Manisseans “would stand it out with us” or fight the English formations in the open. When no attack was forthcoming the English established a temporary encampment and “set forth our Sentinels, and laid out our Pardues, wee betooke our selves to the guard, expecting hourly they would fall upon us.” The English destroyed villages and skirmished with Manissean forces but not being able to provoke a full-fledged engagement the English boarded their ships and proceeded on to Saybrook Fort and then the Pequot [Thames] River.\textsuperscript{125}

Early in the war, English commanders altered the typical European command structure in order to counter the Native tactic of splitting up and fighting in small groups. Underhill commented on this strategy in his narrative of the Pequot War:

I would not have the world wonder at the great number of Commanders to so few men, but know that the Indians fight farre differs from the Christian practise, for they most commonly divide themselves into small bodies, so that we are forced to neglect our usuall way and to subdivide our divisions to answer theirs, and not thinking it any disparagement, to any Captaine to go forth against an Enemy with a squaldron of men taking the ground from the old & ancient practise when they chose Captaines of hundreds and Captaine of thousands, Captaines of fifties and Captaines of tens: We conceive a Captaine signifieth the chiefe in way of Command of anybody committed to his charge for the time being whether of more or lesse, it makes no matter in power though in honour it doth.\textsuperscript{126}

At the time of Mistick Campaign English forces were able to learn far more regarding the armament and strategies of Pequot forces, thanks to Lion Gardiner’s veteran Saybrook Fort garrison who had fought the Pequot throughout the Siege of Saybrook (September 1636-March 1637), and also from Underhill and his nineteen Massachusetts Bay soldiers who were sent to relieve the Fort. Both Gardiner and Underhill provided a realistic assessment of the capabilities and limitations of Pequot forces which helped to

\textsuperscript{125} Underhill, \textit{Newes From America}. P. 7.
\textsuperscript{126} Underhill, \textit{Newes From America}. P. 4.
convince Captain John Mason to alter his original orders which included another direct assault similar to Endicott’s attack on the Pequot (Thames) River in August 1636.

During the English attack on Mistick Fort on May 26, 1637 the tactics used by Mason and Underhill reflect the lessons English commanders had learned since Endicott’s failed expeditions eight months earlier. Increasing the number of officers in a company (two captains, two lieutenants, and several sergeants) allowed the main English force the flexibility to divide into smaller units whenever necessary, which occurred at different points of the battle. During the approach to Mistick Fort the English attack force of 77 men split into two separate companies commanded by Captain’s Mason and Underhill. When each commander prepared to storm the entrances of Mistick Fort, they again split their companies and approximately twenty men from each group fought their way into the fort while the remaining men set up defensive positions along the perimeter. The two groups of 20 were tasked to storm the entrances, equipped with iron armor, edged weapons, and a variety of firearms (muskets, carbines, pistols) loaded with charges of “small-shot” for maximum effect.

V. Methods, Site Identification & Documentation

Historical research for the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Identification and Documentation Plan studied the Quinnipiac Campaign in its entirety but focused specifically on the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp in as much detail as possible.

Battlefield Survey

The discipline of Battlefield Archeology is concerned primarily with the identification and study of sites where conflict took place, and the archeological signature of the event. This requires information gathered from historical records associated with a battlefield including troop dispositions, numbers, and the order of battle (command structure, strength, and disposition of personnel, equipment, and units of an armed force during field operations), as well as undocumented evidence of an action or battle gathered from archeological investigations. The archeology of a battlefield allows battlefield archeologists to reconstruct the progress of a battle, assess the veracity of historical accounts of the battle, as well as fill in any gaps in the historical record. This is particularly
important with respect to the battle as the historical record is often incomplete, inconsistent, and biased. Battlefield archeology seeks to move beyond simple reconstruction of the battlefield event, and move toward a more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{127}

The overall goal of battlefield surveys is to identify and document the historic and geographic extent of the battlefield through the recovery of battle-related objects, assess site integrity (as defined in \textit{National Register Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America’s Historic Battlefields}), provide an overview of surviving resources, and assess short and long term threats to the integrity of the battlefield. Specific steps involved in this process include:

- Research the battlefield event(s);
- Develop a list of battlefield defining natural and cultural features;
- Conduct a visual reconnaissance of the battlefield;
- Locate, document, and photograph features;
- Map troop positions and features on a USGS topographic quadrangle;
- Define study and core engagement areas for each battlefield;
- Assess overall site integrity and threats

\textbf{Analysis of Primary Sources}

The first step to reconstruct a comprehensive military history of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp was to identify the various primary accounts that provided information on battlefield events or sites. Once these accounts were identified they were analyzed to assess the quality, veracity, relevancy, and significance of the material they contained. Very few primary sources survive which discuss the fighting but all three identified accounts were written at the time of the battle. These critical accounts were written by individuals who participated in the battle or by period historians who “interviewed” battle participants. Important considerations in assessing the veracity of individual accounts include: determining who the author was (battle participant or chronicler), why the account was written (\textit{e.g.}, field report, history, Colonial records), how long following an engagement was the account written, and can the information in the account be corroborated by other records.

The primary sources consulted in the course of this research include narratives of the Pequot War, accounts of movements and engagements, field reports written by English

commanders to colonial officials, colonial records, correspondences and letters, and period histories of the war. These sources offer important insights into the many aspects of the battle including possible battlefield locations, movements of combatants on the battlefield, Native and European warfare and tactics, and casualties. The primary sources researched during the course of this study were “deconstructed” to identify all the defining terrain features of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, battle events and movements, avenues of approach and retreat, and village sites.

A total of 15 primary and secondary sources directly reference the fighting that occurred following the Battle of Pequot Swamp, including Philip Vincent’s *A relation of the Pequot War* (1637), John Underhill’s *Newwes from America* (1637), and John Mason’s *History of the Pequot War* (ca. 1660). These accounts along with additional period documentation were individually and collectively analyzed to gather information regarding battlefield features, locations, routes of approach and retreat, the ebb and flow of engagements, the movements of combatants across the battlefield landscape, tactics, weaponry, and specific individuals associated with a battle or action. Very few of the relevant accounts were contradictory and usually corresponded with one another. A combined analysis of all relevant accounts provided a much richer and complex narrative of the battle which assisted in refining the scope and scale of the battlefield study areas.

The historical record associated with the battlefield is used to construct a timeline of discrete battlefield events and material correlates or archeological signatures are then identified for each event. The expected archeological signatures can be used to inform and test hypotheses of unit actions and movements drawn from the historical record. It is often the case that the actual (recovered) archeological signature differs from the expected archeological signature necessitating a reevaluation or reinterpretation of the historic record. Using both Gross-Pattern and Dynamic-Pattern Battlefield Analyses, the spatial and temporal dimensions of a battle can be defined and reconstructed through the integration and continual assessment of the congruence of the historical and archeological record, a process based on the archeological correlates or signatures of individual and unit. In this ongoing process the historical record informs the archeological record as much as the archeological record informs the historical record and both contribute equally to the reconstruction of the battlefield.
The key to this analysis is the ability of battlefield archeologists to integrate the spatial dimensions of unit actions into a temporal framework. This does not necessarily require identification of aggregates of individual behaviors based on modern firearm analysis - the basis for the reconstruction of the Battle of Little Bighorn. The Dynamic Pattern Analysis approach can be applied to Pre-American Civil War battlefields (and non-rifled firearms) such as the Battle of Mistick Fort by focusing on hypothesized unit actions and movements drawn from the historical record and identifying potentially unique material culture signatures that would be associated with the English Allied and Pequot-allied forces. Actions and movements of the various units can be clarified based on the battlefield time line (sequential unit actions and movements) and KOCOA analysis, and integrated into a comprehensive sequence of battlefield actions and events.

The Battlefield Boundary and Core Area locations were identified by integrating information from the following sources: primary accounts, local oral history, local artifact collections, land records, historical maps, aerial photographs, site visits and KOCOA analysis. The precise location and delineation of battlefields and associated sites required fieldwork to better assess battlefield features, terrain and integrity. Archeological surveys (walkover reconnaissance surveys, metal detector survey, sub-surface testing) were particularly important to locate and delineate the seventeenth century battlefields as the documents associated with the battle often lack detail, are incomplete, and sometimes contradictory.

Field Methodology

Landholder Permission

The first step to gain landholder permissions was to hold public informational meetings, send letters and brochures, and make phone calls. Mailings and information meetings achieved great success in acquiring landholder permissions. Project staff focused on cultivating relationships and seeking permissions with particular landholders; the landholders whose property staff believed were located within or adjacent to the battlefield site. Consequently, the strategy that was implemented consisted of holding regular meetings with reluctant landholders to update them on the overall progress of the project, and discuss any ongoing concerns they still had. Permissions were cultivated primarily
through personal contact and relationship building, as conversation and communication became frequent and tangible between project staff and local residents.

**Visual Inspection**

Once landholder permission was granted, a visual inspection followed. Windshield surveys were conducted on properties where permission had not yet been granted as well as initial visual surveys from areas where viewing was possible (*i.e.*, adjoining property, higher elevation, etc.). Visual inspections of individual lots consisted of a walkover of the property with the landholder to gain information on the locations of possible below-ground disturbance (*i.e.*, septic systems, utility lines), and noting landscape features that had either physical or cultural attributes that denoted possible inferences to the battlefield. These discussions with landowners were helpful in reconstructing recent land use history as a means of contextualizing the nature and distribution of the artifacts recovered during the project.

**Land Use Research**

Battlefields of the seventeenth century in New England like those of the Pequot War are unlike any other battlefields in American history. Compared to many American Revolutionary War or Civil War battlefields, there are far more post-event artifacts dating to the later seventeenth through twentieth centuries. Therefore, a land use study was employed as a frame of reference for interpreting the varied artifacts anticipated during fieldwork associated with human occupation and activities over the past 375 years. Peeling back the layers of habitation and varied land use is important to understand and predict the relevance and significance of artifacts signatures and contexts, and to assess site integrity.

Information for the land use study was collected from deeds, town records, historical newspapers, maps, photographs, local histories, books and other various periodicals, oral history and local knowledge, and previous artifact collections from the local area. Results uncovered a light but consistent pattern of landscape occupation in the centuries following the battle (Appendix A).

**KOCOA Evaluation and Analysis**

The United States military has developed a process for evaluating the military significance of the battlefield denoted by the acronym KOCOA; Key and Decisive Terrain,
Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of Approach and Retreat. The NPS ABPP requires the KOCOA approach for all documentation and implementation grants. An important aspect of KOCOA analysis is to identify defining features of the battlefield landscape – aspects of the landscape that are mentioned in battlefield accounts and influenced the nature and progress of the battle. Defining features may be natural (e.g., Mill River, swamps, boulders, ridges) or cultural (e.g., Sasqua Village, roads/paths) and are assessed and evaluated to determine their effect on the process and outcome of the battle. Critical defining features are mapped using GPS and GIS, and surveyed using remote sensing (metal detection and electrical resistivity), and archeological testing and excavation.

Prospective battlefield and ancillary site locations were identified by analyzing and integrating information from the following sources; primary accounts, local oral history, local and institutional artifact collections, land records, historical maps, aerial photographs, site visits, archeological excavation and KOCOA analysis. Battlefield landscapes consist of natural features (hills, streams, valleys, etc.) and cultural features (trails, fortifications, villages, etc.) that define the original battlefield landscape and also reflect the evolution of these features over time and their impacts to the original landscape. In order to identify, document, survey and map a battlefield, historians and archeologists must research all available and relevant historical accounts and identify the historic landscape that defined the battlefield in the field through terrain analysis and identification of natural and cultural features associated with the battlefield.

**Terrain Analysis**

Terrain analysis is a critical aspect of battlefield surveys, so much so that the NPS ABPP require all grant recipients to use KOCOA (Key terrain, Observation, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of approach), a military terrain model the U.S. Army developed to evaluate the military significance of terrain associated with a battlefield. By studying the military applications of the terrain using KOCOA, a battlefield historian or archeologist can identify the landscape of the battlefield and develop a basis for judging the merits and flaws of battle accounts. KOCOA components include:
**Key Terrain and Decisive Terrain** - Key Terrain is any ground which, when controlled, affords a marked advantage to either combatant. Two factors can make terrain key: how a commander wants to use it, and whether his enemy can use it to defeat the commander’s forces. Decisive Terrain is ground that must be controlled in order to successfully accomplish the mission.

**Observation and Fields of Fire** - Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that allows a force to see friendly and enemy forces, and key aspects of the terrain. Fields of Fire are areas where weapons may be covered and fire into from a given position.

**Cover and Concealment** - Cover is protection from enemy fire (e.g., palisade, stone wall, brow of a hill, wooded swamp), and Concealment is protection from observation and surveillance (e.g., ravines, swamps, intervening hill or wood).

**Obstacles** - Obstacles are any features that prevent, restrict, or delay troop movements. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both and fall into two categories: existing (such as swamps, rivers, dense wood, town or village) and reinforcing (placed on a battlefield through military effort).

**Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal** - An avenue of approach is the route taken by a force that leads to its objective or to key terrain in its path. An Avenue of Withdrawal is the route taken by a force to withdraw from an objective or key terrain.

**Table 1: Key Terrain Features & KOCOA Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Relevance to Battle</th>
<th>Field Comment</th>
<th>KOCOA Analysis</th>
<th>Integrity Assessment</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and Topographical Features</td>
<td>Mill River</td>
<td>Present day Southport, CT - English Allied forces pursued fleeing Pequot across the Mill River. Immediately west of the river is the steep eastern slope of Mill Hill.</td>
<td>Moderate Residential; Low Industrial; Public Roads &amp; Bridges; Highway;</td>
<td>Obstacle, Avenue of Approach Pequot &amp; English</td>
<td>Moderate Residential Development, Woodland</td>
<td>Within Battlefield Boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Terrain Features</td>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
<td>Development Status</td>
<td>Spatial Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill Hill</td>
<td>English Allied forces climbed to the heights of Mill Hill in pursuit of fleeing Pequot and for a better viewshed of the surrounding countryside. From there they identified a Native village below near a swamp.</td>
<td>Moderate Woodland</td>
<td>Key Terrain, Observation, Obstacle, Avenue of Approach Pequot &amp; English</td>
<td>Moderate Residential Development, Woodland</td>
<td>Within Battlefield Boundary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munnacommock Swamp</td>
<td>Pequot Allied forces and local Native groups sought shelter in the swamp while warriors mounted a defense against their attackers.</td>
<td>Heavily Developed; Dense Residential; Dense Commercial; Public Roads; Highway</td>
<td>Key Terrain, Observation, Obstacle, Avenue of Approach Pequot &amp; English</td>
<td>High Residential Development, High Commercial Development, Woodland, Open Space</td>
<td>Within Core Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasqua River</td>
<td>The Sasqua Village and swamp lay east of the Sasqua River. Any Pequot warriors retreating to the west would cross the river.</td>
<td>Moderate Residential; Low Industrial; Public Roads &amp; Bridges; Highway; Moderate Woodland</td>
<td>Obstacle</td>
<td>Moderate Residential Development, Woodland</td>
<td>Within Core Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasqua Village</td>
<td>The Sasqua Village was located to the east of the Sasqua River and was near Munnacommock Swamp. It is unclear how large the village was or how many structures it contained.</td>
<td>Dense Residential; Public Roads; Moderate Woodland</td>
<td>Key Terrain, Cover and Concealment, Observation</td>
<td>Moderate Residential Development, Woodland</td>
<td>Within Core Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Viewshed Analysis**

A number of Viewshed Models were developed using elements of KOCOA and GIS. Identified cultural and terrain features were geo-referenced and integrated into cumulative Viewshed Models. A Viewshed is a raster-based map in which from each cell, a straight line is interpolated between a source point and all other cells within an elevation model to find whether or not the cell exceeds the height of the three dimensional line at that point. Therefore, the result of each calculation is either positive or negative. If the result is positive (1) then there is a direct line of sight, if it is negative (0), there is no line of sight.\(^{128}\) The resultant Viewshed Models illustrate locations that could be seen from

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elevations at different locations on the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp site modeling what locations the combatants could see from these positions and how this might influence their actions. These models were very useful for conceptualizing the battlefield landscape and identifying key terrain, avenues of approach and retreat, obstacles and areas of concealment and observation.

The key to this analysis was locating the avenue of approach used by the English and the location of the Sasqua village. The spatial relationship between these two and the swamp was expressed by Mason:

> They pursued them; and coming to the Top of an Hill, saw several Wigwams just opposite, only a Swamp intervening, which was almost divided in two Parts.129

It appears the Pequot and Sasqua fled into a swamp soon after Mason could see the village below. This suggest that Natives within the village could also see English forces now positioned “Top of an Hill” as referred to by Mason:

> …a small Indian town seated by the side of an hideous Swamp (near the place where Fairfield or Stratford now stand) into which they all slipt as well Pequods as natives of the place, before our men could make any shot upon them, having placed a sentinel to give warning.130

> …and after 2 miles march we came where they were and suddenly coming to the place their wigwams being upon the edge of the swamp as soon as ever they saw us they took the swamp, it pleased god it was not very great, and our Company did surround it.131

Least-cost pathways and cost distances (both raster-based derivatives of cost surfaces) were also developed in order to understand the path of least resistance for the English Allied forces route of march once crossing Mill River. In the production of a least cost pathway and cost distance, a “cost surface algorithm” is developed, usually based off slope data and barrier data, the most common obstruction being water features (i.e., swamps, rivers). A cost surface is a modification to a continuous proximity product that measures both proximity and the character of the terrain over which that proximity extends (i.e., slope, ledges). Cost or friction surfaces are algorithms designed to model the amount

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129 Mason in Prince Brief History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
130 Hubbard, Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians. P. 130.
of energy that must be expended to move across a surface (i.e., rate of march possible). Using cost analysis, probable routes of travel across terrain were modeled.

![Figure 6. USGS Map 1893.](image)

![Figure 7. U.S. Coastal and Geodetic Chart, Southport 1880.](image)

Figures 8-14 present various scenarios regarding the position of the English when they initially spotted the Sasqua village on the far side of Munnacommock Swamp from a location on “top of the hill [Mill Hill]” (Figures 6 and 7). Figures 13-14 present two scenarios regarding the

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132 Wheatley and Gillings. *Spatial Technology and Archaeology.*
possible locations of the Sasqua village based on Davenport’s account that the Pequot and Sasqua spotted the English at the same time they were observed “as soon as ever they saw us they took the swamp”. Based on this analysis it appears that the English were not on the very summit of Mill Hill when they initially saw the village (Figures 6 and 7) but were at slightly lower elevations as depicted in Figures 8-12. The locations of the English depicted in Figures 11 and 12 appear to be the best vantage point from which to see the entire area on the western and southwestern side of the swamp but the location in Figure 8 cannot be ruled out. The English position depicted in Figure 12 has a good view of the western and southern side of the swamp but it is so close to the swamp it the English would likely have been spotted well before they arrived at the location.

Figure 8. Viewshed from Top of Mill Hill
Figure 9. Viewshed from Lower Elevation Southwest of Mill Hill Summit.
Figure 10. Viewshed from Lower Elevation on Mill Hill South of Summit.
Figure 11. Viewshed Southwest of Mill Hill Summit.
Figure 12. Viewshed from Southernmost Elevation.
Figure 133. Viewshed from Sasqua Village Location Northwest Corner of Fairfield Swamp.
Figure 144. Viewshed from Sasqua Village Southwest Corner of Fairfield Swamp.

VI. Results and Battlefield Event Synthesis

Battle Narrative and Sequence

Constructing a narrative for the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp prior to the archeological survey consisted of a synthesis of historical research, material culture analyses, and a cultural landscape study. Findings indicate that fighting between English Allied forces and Pequot Allied forces occurred sporadically between the time the English made landfall at Quinnipiac (present-day New Haven) and their advance towards Pequonnock (present-day Bridgeport). For the purpose of this study, Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp begins on the afternoon of July 13 1627 at the present-day Mill River in Sasqua territory as English Allied forces climb Mill Hill in pursuit of Pequot and visually identify a village near a swamp to their south. Fighting commences as Pequot Allied forces and Native non-combatants flee into Munnacommock Swamp for safety while two companies of English Allied forces advance to the swamp; combat quickly
intensifies as additional troops arrive on scene. There is a low in the fighting as English and Native representatives parley and negotiate a surrender of non-combatants. Fighting immediately continues after the parley and throughout the night and into the early morning of July 14, 1637. Before daybreak Pequot Allied forces attack one section of the English Allied siege line which succeeded in drawing English troops towards the fighting, opening large gaps in the siege line through which the majority of their forces escape. The battle ends on the morning of July 14, 1637 around daybreak as English Allied forces lift their siege of Munnacommock Swamp in order to pursue retreating Pequot Allied forces.

**Timeline**

A detailed analysis and reconstruction of the sequence of events, movements and actions associated with the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp suggests the battlefield timeline presented in Table 2. These events, movements and actions were assumed to have a unique archeological signature across time and space. The sequencing of historical events will assist in a future battlefield survey in modeling and anticipating archeological signatures and potential material culture that may be encountered.
### Table 2: Battlefield Event Timeline of Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Unit &amp; No. of Combatants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Time &amp; Duration</th>
<th>Primary Resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crossing Mill River and climbing Mill Hill</td>
<td>Unknown Pequot Allied Non-Combatants and Warriors. Approx. 20 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies</td>
<td>Mill River and Mill Hill, Southport, CT</td>
<td>July 13, 1637; Approx. 12:00-12:30 pm</td>
<td>We then hastened our March towards the Place where the Enemy was: And coming into a Corn Field, several of the English espied some Indians, who fled from them: They pursued them; and coming to the Top of an Hill, saw several Wigwams just opposite, only a Swamp intervening, which was almost divided in two Parts.(^{133})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Descending Mill Hill to Munnacommock Swamp</td>
<td>Unknown Pequot Allied Non-Combatants and Warriors. Approx. 20 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies</td>
<td>Mill Hill, Southport, CT</td>
<td>July 13, 1637; Approx. 12:30-1:00 pm</td>
<td>…a small Indian town seated by the side of an hideous Swamp (near the place where Fairfield or Stratford now stand) into which they all slit as well Pequods as natives of the place, before our men could make any shot upon them, having placed a sentinel to give warning.(^{134})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mason’s Company surrounds smaller part of swamp. Lt. Davenport’s men ambushed in swamp.</td>
<td>Approx. 30 Pequot Allied Warriors. Approx. 20 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies</td>
<td>Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, Southport, CT</td>
<td>July 13, 1637; Approx. 1:00-2:00 pm</td>
<td>Serjeant Palmer hastening with about twelve Men who were under his Command to surround the smaller Part of the Swamp, that so he might prevent the Indians flying:Ensign Davenport, Serjeant Jeffries &amp; c. entering the Swamp, intended to have gone to the Wigwams, were there set upon by several Indians, who in all probability were deterred by Serjeant Palmer. In this Skirmish the English slew but few: two or three of themselves were Wounded: The rest of the English coming up, the Swamp was surrounded.(^{135})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Remainder of English Allied Forces gradually arrive and surround swamp and</td>
<td>Approx. 60-80 Pequot Allied Warriors. Approx. 160 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies</td>
<td>Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, Southport, CT</td>
<td>July 13, 1637; Approx. 1:00-5:00 pm</td>
<td>The rest of the English coming up, the Swamp was surrounded.(^{137})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{133}\) Mason in Prince Brief History of the Pequot War. P. 15.

\(^{134}\) Hubbard, Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians. P. 130.

\(^{135}\) Winthrop Papers. P. III:454.

\(^{136}\) Mason in Prince Brief History of the Pequot War. Pp. 15-16.

\(^{137}\) Mason in Prince Brief History of the Pequot War. P. 15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5 | A low in the fighting occurs as a Sasqua Sachem and English interpreter Thomas Stanton parley and negotiate the surrender of non-combatants. Approx. 60-80 Pequot Allied Warriors. Approx. 160 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies Pequot (Munnacomock) Swamp, Southport, CT July 13, 1637; Approx. 5:00-8:00 pm …Tho. Stanton a Man well acquainted with the Indian Language and Manners, offered his Service to go into the Swamp and treat with them: To which we were somewhat backward, by reason of some Hazard and Danger he might be exposed unto: But his importunity prevailed: Who going to them, did in a short time return to us, with near Two Hundred old Men, Women and Children; who Delivered themselves to the Mercy of the English.

138 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. Pp. 16-17. |
| 6 | Combat occurs throughout the evening and into the early morning. Before dawn Pequot Allied forces break through English lines and escape. Approx. 60-80 Pequot Allied Warriors. Approx. 160 English Soldiers and Unknown Native Allies Pequot (Munnacomock) Swamp, Sasqua River, Southport, CT July 13-14, 1637; Approx. 8:00pm-4:00am And so Night drawing on, we beleaguered them as strongly as we could. About half an Hour before Day, the Indians that were in the Swamp attempted to break through Captain Patrick’s Quarters’ but were beaten back several times; they making a great Noise, as their Manner is at such Times, it sounded round about our leaguer: Whereupon Captain Mason sent Serjeant Stares to inquire into the Cause, and also to assist if need required; Capt. Traske coming also in to their Assistance: But the Tumult growing to a very great Heighth, we raised our Siege; and Marching up to the Place, at a Turning of the Swamp the Indians were forcing out upon us; but we sent them back by our small Shot. We waiting a little for a second Attempt; the Indians in the mean time facing about, pressed violently upon Captain Patrick, breaking through his Quarters, and so escaped. They were about sixty or seventy as we were informed.

139 Mason in Prince *Brief History of the Pequot War*. P. 17. | Arrow Points and Lead Shot

Low. Dropped or Discarded Native personal items. Moderate. Dropped English and Native personal items, clothing items. Impacted and Dropped Cuprous Arrow Points and Lead Shot.
VII. Conclusion

The goal of the NPS ABPP “Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp, July 13-14, 1637” Planning and Consensus Building Grant was to develop a strategic, phased approach to protect and preserve the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp site and ancillary sites associated with it. The original project scope included three principle components; 1) research, identify and analyze all primary accounts of the battle to identify primary and secondary site locations and routes of approach and retreat, and create a detailed map of the entire Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp site, 2) cultivate relationships with landowners, town officials, local historians, and the general public, and secure landowner permissions to pursue archaeological testing, 3) develop a long-term research, education and preservation plan for the battlefield site. The first two tasks were completed. The third task, development of a long-term preservation plan, will be completed following completion of fieldwork to document delineate the sites associated with the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp.

The NPS ABPP Planning and Consensus Building Grant provided a unique opportunity for the Fairfield Museum and History Center to begin a long-term collaborative project to research, document and preserve the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp and in the process inform and educate the general public of the significance of the Pequot War and its ongoing legacy. The Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Core Area within the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Battlefield Boundary is proposed for field research in 2017 and 2018. The analysis and integration of primary narratives and accounts, local oral history, local artifact collections, land records, historical maps, aerial photographs, site visits, and KOCOA analysis provided the necessary information to place the battles, actions and sites on USGS topographic maps with a reasonable degree of confidence and to predict the nature and distribution of artifacts indicative of the “signature” of each site and action.

A Site Identification and Documentation grant proposal was submitted to the NPS ABPP in January of 2018 and awarded in August of 2018. The purpose of the project is to conduct a Site Identification and Documentation Survey of the Munnacommock Swamp and Sasqua Village Core Area associated with the Battle of Fairfield (Munnacommock)
Swamp. The FMHC will conduct metal detector and limited archaeological surveys within the Core Area. The goal of the project will be to define battlefield boundaries, assess areas of integrity, and assess the eligibility of the battlefield for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places. This information will be used to develop a long-term preservation plan through collaboration with the National Park Service, Connecticut Historical Preservation Commission, Office of the State Archaeologist, and the Town of Fairfield Planning and Zoning Commission.

Expected results of the fieldwork will include:

1. A database of all tactical and combat actions associated with the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp including a timeline of battles and actions from the perspectives of individual commanders;

2. GIS data files which will include boundaries of Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp including locations of villages, fortifications, major engagements and individual actions including Pequot counterattacks and skirmishes, clarification/refinement of the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp boundary, locations and movements of Colonial and Native combatants, location of modern structures, and all artifacts found during surveys;

3. A final report which will present methods and results of historical research, remote sensing and field testing, artifact and terrain analysis;

4. Preservation proposal for Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp Battlefield Boundary and preparation of National Register forms for potentially significant sites.

Research in subsequent years will focus on identification and documentation of sites, battles, and actions during the Battle of Pequot (Munnacommock) Swamp.
VIII. Works Cited

Primary Source Materials


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Secondary Source Materials


Appendix A. Land Use at Pequot Swamp

Introduction

Like so many leafy suburbs in New England, the area of Southport, Connecticut, where the Battle of Pequot Swamp took place has been greatly altered over the past 375 years. The settlement of the English several years after the battle, and the continued division of the area for agricultural usage during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries intermingled houses and farm structures with woodland, and marshes with roadways, pastureland, and orchards. When the railway arrived in 1849 the area’s ensuing transformation to a countryside destination and then a suburban idyll became absolute. Subsequent construction of Interstate 95 a century later would seem to have completely obliterated any sign of the swamp that Captain John Mason and his English compatriots encountered on July 13, 1637. However, as one drives through the area, the contours of the high and low grounds are still discernable in places, and some wetlands remain. Against so many odds, aspects of Pequot Swamp have persisted.

This study is reliant on primary sources that include Fairfield Town Records, contemporary maps, newspaper articles, and secondary sources, such as histories of Southport and Fairfield, as well as books on specific aspects, like the construction of roadways in Connecticut. The secondary histories include nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first century interpretations. Pequot Library and the Fairfield Museum and History Center Library (Fairfield Historical Society) have collections pertaining to the area and were great resources. However, the Museum does not have documentation or artifacts from the Battle of Pequot Swamp.

English Settlement and Proprietors of Pequot Swamp (1600-1700)

In her 1927 “An Historical Story of Southport, Connecticut,” Charlotte Alvord Lacy presents an evocative depiction of the area that has become known as “Pequot Swamp.” She describes a creek that travels inland from present-day Long Island Sound:

After a winding course of perhaps a half mile a dense swamp is reached, spreading through the forest at base of rocky ledges leading up to high hills toward the north and east. This swamp is considerable in area, thickly
wooded and almost impenetrable from the dense growth of underbrush. The wooded tract between the swamp and the river contains several ponds. This broad level of tract of low land bordering the Sound and backed by the far-reaching forests was the chosen home of a peaceable tribe of Indians who called their holdings Sasqua, or Sasquannock, which meant marsh land.

Their wigwams were grouped in the outskirts of the forest. They tilled the fertile soil, growing maize or Indian corn. The forests were abounding in game—deer, foxes, bears, rabbits, etc.140

When recalling the pursuit of the Pequots in 1637, Captain John Mason provides a contemporary vision of the area where the Battle of Pequot Swamp would take place. “We then hastened our March towards the Place where the Enemy was: And coming into a Corn Field, several of the English espied some Indians, who fled from them: They pursued them; and coming to the Top of an Hill, saw several Wigwams just opposite, only a Swamp intervening, which was almost divided in two Parts.”141

The swamp was Munnacommock swamp and the local Sasqua inhabited the village of wigwams. After the Pequot War, the swamp would be referred to as “pequit swamp,” in commemoration of the battle which took place from July 13 through 14 in 1637. Two years after the battle, Deputy Governor of Connecticut, Roger Ludlow, returned to the fertile fields of Uncoway and there founded the town of Fairfield. He purchased the land east of the Sasqua River and west of the Pequonnock River from the Pequonnock Indians.

In the seventeenth century, the area between Sasqua River (now Mill River) and Sasco Creek was called Sasco Fields (now Southport); Pequot Swamp was located within Sasco Fields. In 1669, Fairfield began dividing the area west of the Mill River. Pequot Swamp was located just inland, within Sasco Fields/between the Sasqua River and Sasco Creek. In 1670, the town bought “the last six miles of the Indians: of the Towne Commons: and they having agreed that the Towne shall give them 36 pounds for it.”142 In 1680, these transactions were reconfirmed with new Indian deeds, in order to reaffirm Fairfield’s

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ownership of the Sasqua and Pequonnock lands that Ludlow had purchased to create Fairfield.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{sasco_river_map.png}
\caption{Detail of 1766 map, showing Sasco River and Mill River. Pequot Swamp was located between the two. The roadway is the King’s Road.\textsuperscript{144}}
\end{figure}

The town’s agreement with the Indians goes into great detail as to when lands were originally purchased and where the boundaries lie. Each section presents formal, signed acknowledgment from representatives of both the town and the Indians.\textsuperscript{145} These documents affirm the legal purchase of the land by the town from the Indians.

\begin{quote}
To all people to whom these presents shall com Greeting Whereas there have been Severall bills of Sale by us ye Indian propietors unto ye Towne of ffairfield of all ye Lands they poses within their Township bounds except those particular lands hereafter mentioned: Seqestred for or use as by or Genrl: bill of Sale bearing date ye 6\textsuperscript{th} Day of octobr last past may more fully appeare … Know all men these presents ut Wheres ye Town of Fairfield hath formerly bouth of ye threu Indian proprieors all ye Land contained within their Township bounds which is Seven miles broad upon ye Sea Coast and from ye Sea at Least twelve miles into ye Country to ye Northward of their bounds bounded on ye East with ye sd Towne boundes\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{144} Moses Park and William Petty Lansdowne, Marquis of. \textit{To the right honourable, the Earl of Shelbourne, His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Southern Department. This plan of the colony of Connecticut in North-America}. London, 1766.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Fairfield Town Records}. Vol. A. October 6, 1680. Pp. 509-16.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. Pp. 509 & 11.
The center of the Town of Fairfield was approximately two miles east and up the coast from Sasqua River and the location of the Battle of Pequot Swamp and had jurisdiction over the Pequot Swamp area.147

Granted to John Banks Senr. By the Towne one parcel of Land in Sasscoefield being in quantity five Acres more or less: bounded on the southeast and Northeast with highwayes on the northwest side by a highway on the brow of ye hill next pequit Swamp: on the Southwest with the Land of John Wheler: ther is a highway runs through this parcel of Land at that end next John Whelers land:

Alsoe in the said field one parcel of land being in quantity two Acres and half being more or Less bounded on the west with the Land of John Barlowe Junr: on the east with the land of Thomas Sherington on the north and south with highwayse ther is a highway runs through the lower end of this parcel148

The names Banks, Wheeler, Barlow, and Sherington are some of the earliest in Fairfield and often appear in the history of Southport.

In 1673, the Town of Fairfield was still making grants of land that bordered on Pequot Swamp, as newcomers continued to settle in the area.

Also [the Town] hath granted him [Francis Bradle] in the saide field one parsell of land by Pequit swamp being in quantity one Acrew three quarters and four rod more or less bounded on the northwast with the land of John Green: on the southeast with ye land of John Bur on the other sides with highways149

The increased reference to highways in town records during this period underscores the continued growth of the area and the need for more formal ways of transit/passage.

By the 1680s, Pequot Swamp land was being further divided, whether by inheritance or purchase from the original benefactor of the town’s grant. Upon John Bank’s death, his property at the Swamp was given to his son Benjamin.

147 Farnham. P. 14.
Thes undar wretan parsels of land are all given to beniamin banks by boath his father John banks Sener of fayrfeild deceased his will and deed of gift which deed of gift is dated ye 12 of January 1684 imprimes on parsell of Land lying in sasco field being payd John banks his first decndent thare being in quantity five acres more or less bounded on ye southeast and Northeast with highways on ye Northwst side by a highway on ye brow of ye hill next pequit Swamp on ye Southwest with ye Land of John wheelar that is a highway runeth throw this parsell of Land on yt sid next John wheeler150

Later in that decade is the first mention of “horse tavern,” a landmark that exists to this day, albeit in a much abbreviated form due to nineteenth and twentieth century conduits. Horse Tavern Creek used to run through the Pequot Swamp area, its mouth emptying into the harbor.151

Thees presents testefie ye John bulkley hath resigned up to ye towne fouer acres of Land in Sasco field near the hors tavern bounded on ye South east with a highway on ye Southwest with ye land of mr Samll Wakman on ye Northwest with ye Land of Joseph bulkley on ye Northeast with ye Salt marsh and ye commety appointed to exchange Lands for ye towne have granted to ye sd john Bulkley Six acres of Land in ye woods being by ye sd Johns pastener Lott it is bounded on ye Southeast with ye Common on ye Southwest with ye Land appartang to ye heiers of Thomas Barlow decested on ye Northwest with ye Common on ye Northeast with ye Land of st John Bulkley this Land is in full consedaration for his resignation of ye fouer acres of Land in Sasco field as above sd in wenees whear of neer as wee are of ye sd Commety have hear Unto set to our hands this 29th October 1687152

Because its course meandered through the swamp area, touching many properties, Horse Tavern Creek is continually used as a point of reference.

In the 1690s, John Osborn is noted as owning land in the Pequot Swamp area that would be passed down for many years through his family.153

151 Elizabeth Hubbell Schenck tells us that Horse Tavern creek was so-called on account of its use as a place for horses to drink. Elizabeth Hubbell Schenck. The History of Fairfield, Fairfield County, Connecticut, from the Settlement of the Town in 1639 to 1818. Vol. I. (Fairfield, CT: The Author, 1889.) P. 46

153 John Osborn is said to be the son of Richard Osborn, an English soldier during the Pequot Swamp fight, who returned to settle in Fairfield. Schenck. P. 401.
John osburn hath purchased of John Gruman a parcel of land in sasscoe field commonly so called near the horse tavern with all the privledges and appurtaneces there unto belonging the land is in Quantity foure Acres by Grant with what over plus of mesuer is layed out by the community be it more or less bounded on the southwest with the land appertaining to the heirs of Danll lockwood Deceased on the northwest with a highway on the north East with the land appertaining to the heirs of Left John Bankes Deceased & the highway on the south East with the highway leading to the farms

John Osborne hath purchased of John Bur one percell of upland Lying in Sascoe field Comanly so called in ye bounds of fairfeild & is in quantity four acress be it more or less bounded on ye South & on ye north with ye highway & on ye East & on ye west with ye Land of the saide John Osborne

On the above property, John Osborn would build a house that still stands, adjacent to the wetlands in the Pequot Swamp area – present-day Kings Highway West. This was the main roadway and ran east to west through Fairfield, and had originally been an Indian trail.

As the Indians had before them, seventeenth-century settlers to the area would have harvested corn on the land and planted crops like beans and peas that could have grown among the corn stalks. Apple orchards were also common. They would have raised hogs and cattle and assorted fowl.

**Land Use at Pequot Swamp (1700-1800)**

Seventeenth century land use set the stage for the next century. As with land usage in similarly situated New England communities, use of the Pequot Swamp area for agriculture lasted well into the eighteenth century. Properties are transferred on a fairly regular basis and land use remains much the same. However, farther inland on fertile Mill Plain and up Mill Hill, the same hill from which Captain Mason first spied Munnacommock (Pequot) Swamp, additional crops like oats and rye were being grown and milled on one

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157 Both Albion’s Seed (David Hackett Fischer) and Fairfield, the Biography of a Community (Thomas Farnham) discuss the agricultural practices of this period.
of the two mills along Mill River.\textsuperscript{158} From the 1840s, the onion became so popular that Southport became known for its onions. Roadways, like Hulls Highway and Mill Plain Road, provided a direct route to farmland.

The American Revolution, which had such an effect on the Town of Fairfield when the British burned the center of the town in 1779, seems to have had little impact on land usage in the Pequot Swamp area. The new roadways, which intersected the Pequot Swamp, had a greater effect. They allowed for quick transport of goods between farms and harbor. Houses, barns, and blacksmith shops appeared along the roads.

The largest change of land use during the eighteenth century occurred with the growth of the harbor at the mouth of Mill River, present-day Southport Harbor. Although outside our area of study, it is relevant to the growth of Southport through the late eighteenth and into the twentieth century. The harbor was sheltered, fairly shallow, and increasingly easily accessed through roadways built for the transportation of goods to and from the merchant ships. In 1799, dredging of the harbor together with the formalization of the road that would become the first Connecticut Turnpike, encouraged merchants to use the harbor. Ships would transport produce such as corn, oats, rye, cheese, pork, buckwheat, and feathers.\textsuperscript{159} Some families, like the Perrys and Bulkleys became exceedingly wealthy due to their endeavors. In the nineteenth century, they would build the immense houses which still line Harbor Avenue, the main road along Southport Harbor. However, inland, the Pequot Swamp area remained fairly static in terms of land usage.

\textbf{Land Use at Pequot Swamp (1800-1900)}

A topographical map from 1827 produced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers details land use in the Pequot Swamp vicinity. This is the earliest detailed map found for the purposes of this study. The map clearly marks orchards, woodland, salt marshes, meadows, pastures, stone walls, rail fences, building structures, and “turnpikes.” On the top portion of the map, a section of the roadway is “corduroy.”\textsuperscript{160} Logs were placed

\textsuperscript{158} Farnham. P 114.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. P. 115.
\textsuperscript{160} Lieut. S. Eastman, U.S. Army. \textit{Treatise on Topographical Drawing}. (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1837.) Plates 1-4. This source documents the topographical meaning of each image on the map.
perpendicular to and across a road for easy transit over a swamp or muddy area.\textsuperscript{161} This would seem to indicate that present-day Kings Highway West traversed the Pequot Swamp area. Kings Highway West began as an Indian trail and has alternately been known as Kings Highway, the Boston Post Road, and the Connecticut Turnpike.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{1827 detail of topographical map showing land usage of Pequot Swamp area to Mill River.\textsuperscript{162}}
\end{figure}

In Figure 2, the morass of Pequot Swamp is shown to be a wooded dip in the landscape, through which the corduroy road traverses. To its east lie meadows and pastureland. Houses are dotted throughout. A vestige of the triangle of land in the upper left corner is still in existence, as are many of the nearby building structures. The vertical

\textsuperscript{161} Cece Saunders. “Corduroy Roads,” \textit{Historical Perspectives, Inc.} Friends of the Office of State Archaeology. Spring 2009. \url{http://www.fosa-ct.org/Reprints/Spring2009_CorduroyRoads.htm}. Placing logs through a muddy or swampy portion of a road has been commonly used since at least the Roman times. A similar road was constructed across Ash Creek wetlands on the eastern end of Fairfield.

road is present-day Pequot Avenue (which ends at the horizontal West Way in this map) and the road on the left is now called Oxford Road. Horse Tavern Creek meanders southward from the northeast corner towards the harbor.

Figure 3. Detail of 1845 map showing the route of the railroad. The tracks pass precisely through the Pequot Swamp area.\textsuperscript{163}

Change came quickly in the nineteenth century, even the colloquial “Sascoe Fields” became known as “Southport.”\textsuperscript{164} One of the most impressive houses was the Marquand Mansion, constructed in 1832 on the corner of Pequot Avenue and West Way Road. The house was demolished in 1892 to make way for Pequot Library. Pequot Avenue, which had been excavated in 1835 to allow traffic to traverse a raised portion of the swamp, was further improved.\textsuperscript{165} New Yorkers saw the benefits of the Southport idyll, and grand houses began to line the avenue as lakes were drained and sidewalks installed. In 1887, the Sasquanaug Association was created to “improve and beautify the Village of Southport.”\textsuperscript{166} This included the burying of Horse Tavern Creek.

\textsuperscript{163} Anderson, P. \textit{Detailed topographic strip map showing the coast from New York City to New Haven, Conn.} (New York: Snyder & Black Lithogrs., 1845.)

\textsuperscript{164} Farnham. P. 145.

\textsuperscript{165} Schenck. P. 7.

\textsuperscript{166} Sasquanaug Association website: \url{http://www.sasquanaug.org/about.html}. The Association continues to wield influence as to land use in the area.
Figure 4 shows an increased division of properties along the railroad and house construction along Pequot Avenue. These properties have large lawns and are not for farming. Gone are the orchards, meadows, and pastures of the 1827 map. Centre [sic] Street has been built to help with transportation of goods from the farms along Hulls Highway, to the northwest, to the wharves along the harbor. Northwest of the railway land owned by Frederick Marquand and the Hawkins family remains swamp and woodland and for agricultural usage. The Connecticut Turnpike, to the north, has become an official route. Horse Tavern Creek is still running fairly freely. Trinity Episcopal Church (ca. 1862) is now at the corner of Centre Street and Pequot Avenue. However, Southport Congregational has yet to be built.

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168 Ibid.
Figure 5 shows the five corners, which became the center of Southport Village. “Highway” denotes the east end of present-day Pequot Avenue. In 1849, the New York and New Haven Railroad opened, connecting New York City to New Haven. Tracks sliced through the center of the Pequot Swamp terrain, dividing properties and upsetting the natural landscape. The railway initiated an era of growth, as travel time between New York and Southport diminished. The popularity of Southport as a countryside destination grew, and so did the need for an actual village center. Shops at the intersection of Pequot Avenue, Main Street, and Rose Hill provided basic necessities.

Figure 5. Detail of 1890 map showing conversion of railway tracks from grade crossings.

The railway continued to change the area around Pequot Swamp. In 1887, it was decided that “highway” crossings should no longer be at grade to make way for expansion to a 4-track line and for public safety. Works were put in place to create underpasses, which

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169 Ibid.
170 New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail Road Co. map, Oct. 1890.
were considered safer means of crossing the busy lines. Landholders were advised that their properties would be affected by this order. Among those were Josiah Hawkins and Trinity Episcopal Church.  

Construction of trolley lines connecting Southport with Fairfield and Bridgeport followed quickly in 1894 and with it shops like Carey’s confectionary opened along the new village center at the five corners (Figure 5.) The trolley was said to stop at the blacksmith shop on Pequot Avenue. This coincided with a drop in maritime traffic to what was too shallow and narrow a harbor for the new age of larger vessels. The trolley helped change the center of commerce from the harbor to Pequot Avenue. A number of shops moved from the harbor to the village. Switzer’s Pharmacy, which still exists, made the move along with Disbrow’s Grocery Store, and the Jelliff wire manufactory built a two-story brick building along Pequot Avenue in 1906.

Figure 6 shows the Marquand property north of the railroad that has been transferred to Josiah Hawkins, and Pequot Library sits where Marquand’s mansion stood. His heirs had the house demolished after his death. The Southport Congregational Church (ca. 1876) now appears, as well as numerous shops and buildings at the Southport Village five corners. Property on the south side of Pequot Avenue, adjacent to Trinity Episcopal Church, has been developed. Horse Tavern Creek is still flowing fairly unconstricted.

Land Use at Pequot Swamp (1900-2000)

The major factors in transformation of land use in the Pequot Swamp area during the twentieth century were the construction of Interstate 95 and further development of wetlands for recreation and housing. The mercantile aspects of the harbor continued their decline, and Southport continued its change into a gentile enclave.

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172 Southport Chronicle. October 15, 1894.
173 Farnham. P. 205.
174 Ibid.
Figure 6. Detail of 1896 map of Southport.\textsuperscript{175}

Figure 7. Aerial Survey, ca. 1934.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{175} George Palmer. Map of Southport, Conn. 1896.
\textsuperscript{176} Fairchild Aerial Survey of CT 1934 photograph 05490 CT State Archives
Automobiles have had the most significant effect on the area. A comparison of two aerial views, one from 1934 (Figure 7) and the other from 2017 (Figure 8) show the drastic changes in land usage in eight decades. With greater use of trucks for transportation, Route 1 (or the Connecticut Turnpike), became increasingly congested, despite having been widened in 1925. The need was apparent for a more efficient road. In 1952, the Federal Highway Commission authorized use of federal funds for construction of interstate highways, making them more accessible for states to build. In 1956, the Federal Highway Act further eased states’ burdens with the inauguration of a trust fund to pay for highway construction. The planning and building of Interstate 95 is a direct result.\textsuperscript{177} Town records show mass requisition of lands along the roadway from 1955-1958.\textsuperscript{178} As well as slicing through the remnants of Pequot Swamp and causing dramatic trauma to the landscape, the project displaced hundreds of residents.

The 1947 Westford Drive development of modest Cape Cod houses was the first housing complex built in Southport. Carved out of land previously owned by the Hawkins family, the horse shoe shaped road lies between the railroad and Interstate 95.\textsuperscript{179} These houses remain modestly priced in an area that has some of the most costly real estate in the United States.\textsuperscript{180} Subsequent housing developments have been priced for a higher market. The Southgate Condominium Association constructed 16 units at 405 Center Street in 1992. In 2001, a partnership of Southport residents formed a development corporation to build 28 high-end housing units on 4.4 acres just off I-95. The aim was to prevent an office tower from being constructed.\textsuperscript{181} In the early 2000s, the land surrounding the historic John Osborn House was divided for development. Three contemporary houses were built on the property, in close proximity to the historic home, which abuts wetlands to the south. The 26 units comprising Pequot Landing were built around the same time, ca. 2003-2006. Built

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Connecticut Department of Transportation 100 Year History. Managing Travel in Connecticut: 100 Years of Progress. (Hartford: Connecticut Department of Transportation in Cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration: July 1995. P. 46.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Fairfield Town Records. Grantee: 1948-1958, A-D.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Several of the Westford Street houses were built in 1950 and one in 1963. Town of Fairfield IQS online search: \url{https://www.searchiqs.com/ctfai/Login.aspx}
  \item \textsuperscript{180} This assertion is reliant on comparisons of real estate listings in Trulia, Zillow, and New York Times listings.
\end{itemize}
precisely within the Pequot Swamp area, these units occupy a portion of a 7.6 acre property, much of which is designated wetlands.

Wakeman Boys and Girls Club moved to their present location on Center Street, adjacent to the railroad in 1954. At the time, the property had been farmland. When the Club installed a turf field in 2005, any remnants of Pequot War era material would likely have been destroyed. The prevalence of parking lots in the area is also an indication of the significance of the car to the development of the swampland. Both Trinity Episcopal and Southport Congregational churches have large paved parking lots, as do train station (north and southbound), shops in the village, restaurants along Old Post Road, Pequot Library, Wakeman Boys and Girls Club, and the condominiums. All of these parking lots have impacted the swamp.

In Figure 8, Interstate 95 can be seen to cut through some of the remaining swamp area. Although hugely diminished from its seventeenth century size, swampland persists and is visible in this image. The largest tracts belong to the Town of Fairfield, Pequot Landing, Trinity Church, the Sasquanaug Association, Southport Congregational Church, Aspetuck Land Trust, and the Southport Conservancy. These properties are slated to be preserved in perpetuity. However, other lands, like the house at 75 Chester Place, which is being built on open land (that was sub-divided in the 1970s). The property sits at the corner of Pequot Avenue near the village center, which has also undergone change over the past century.

Southport Village retains its intimate scale of one- and two-story buildings. The Jelliff building is now offices and an antiques shop. Switzer’s Pharmacy still exists, as does the post office. The train station has been transformed into a high-end restaurant. However, the Driftwood Sandwich Shop and Horseshoe Café maintain a more modest clientele. Several clothing and jewelry shops have opened in existing buildings and a Chase Bank now sits at the northeast corner of Pequot Avenue and the Old Post Road. Up the Old Post

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182 Ibid.
184 The Southport conservancy, Sasquanaug Association, and Fairfield Historic Commission all work to maintain the character of Southport, as they perceive it.
Road and to the east is Southport Park, a ten-acre open space maintained by Aspetuck Land Trust, a local land conservation group.

Figure 8. 2017 Google Map of the Pequot Swamp area.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{185} Google Map of 06890. 2017.
Table 1. Table of Land Usage at Pequot Swamp: Dates and Major Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battlefield</td>
<td>July 1637</td>
<td>Battle of Pequot Swamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English settlement</td>
<td>1669-70</td>
<td>Fairfield purchases land between Mill River and Sasco Creek for dispersal among settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/farming</td>
<td>ca. 1690</td>
<td>John Osborn House constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly farming</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Topographical map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Marquand house constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadway</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>Part of Pequot Avenue excavated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass transit</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>New York – New Haven railroad opens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Trinity Episcopal Church opens on Pequot Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Southport Congregational Church built of stone on Pequot Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Pequot Library opens on Pequot Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass transit</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Conversion of railroad tracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass transit</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Trolley lines installed along Route 1 to Pequot Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Carney’s confectionary opens in Southport Village (along with other shops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Jelliff wire manufactory opens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadway</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Route 1 widened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Westford Road developed with Cape Cod houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Wakemen Boys &amp; Girls club opens new clubhouse on Center Street (and fields)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadway</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Interstate 95 opens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Condominiums open on Center Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/Recreation</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Pequot Landing built with wetlands integrated into plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2003-2014</td>
<td>Houses adjacent to John Osborn house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Wakeman Boys and Girls Club constructs turf fields along Center Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Southport Village Partners builds condo units by Old Post Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Southport Park open space opens to the public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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*Southport Chronicle*. October 15, 1894.

Appendix B:  Quinnipiac Campaign Primary Source Excerpts

The following primary source excerpts are transcribed exactly as they appear in the original document and are presently in order of when they were published.


[16]
…They pursued the remnant threescore miles beyond the Country (till within 36 miles of the Dutch plantations on Hudsons river) where they fought with them, killed fortie or fiftie besides those that they cut off in their retrait, and tooke prisoners 180, that came out of a Swampe and yielded themselves upon promise of good quarter. Some other small parties of them were since destroyed, and Captaine Patrick with 16 or 18 brought 80 Captives to the Bay of Boston. The newes of the flight of Sassacus their Sagamore, is also confirmed. He went with forty men to the Mowhacks, which are a cruel bloodie Caniballs, and the most terrible to their neighbors of all these nations: but will scarce dare ever to carrie armes against the English, of whom they are sore afraid, not daring to encounter white men with their hot-mouth’d weapons, which spit nothing else but bullets and fire.
…These cruell, but wily Mowhacks, in contemplation of the English, and to procure their friendship, entertaine the fugitive Pequest and their Captaine, by cutting off all their heads and hands, which they sent to the English, as a testimony of their love and service.

John Underhill, *Newes from America; or, a New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England; Containing, a True Relation of their War-like Proceedings there Two Years Last Past, with a Figure of the Indian Fort, or Palizado*. J.D. for Peter Cole: London, 1638.

[44]
…The forces which were prepared in the Bay were ready for to set forth: my selfe being taken on but for 3 moneths, and the souldiers willing to returne to the Bay, we imbar- qued our selves, & set to sayle; in our journey we met with certaine Pinaces, in them a 100 able and we ap- pointed souldiers under the conduct of one Captaine Stoughton, and other inferior officers; and in compa- ny with them one M. John Wilson, who was sent to in- struction the Company; these falling into Pequeat river, met with many of the distressed Indians, some they slew, others they tooke prisoners.


[115] …the Lord (who would have his people know their work was his, and he onely must order their Counsels, and war-like work for them) did bring them timely supply form the vesels, and also gave them a second victory, wherein they slew many more of their e- nemies, the residue flying into a very thick swamp, being unac- cessible, by reason of the boggy holes of water, and thick bushes; the English drawing up their company beleaguered the swamp, and the Indians in the mean time skulking up and down, and as they saw opportunity they made shot with their Arrowes at the English, and then suddainly they would fall flat along in the wa- ter to defend themselves from the retaliation of the Souldiers Muskets. This lasted not long, for our English being but a small number, had parted themselves far asunder, but by the providence of most high god, some of them spyped an Indian with a kettle at his back going more inwardly into the swamp, by which they perceived there was some place of firm land in the midst thereof, which caused them to make way for the passage of

[116] of their Souldiers, which brought this warre to a period: For al- though many got away, yet were they no such considerable num- ber as ever to raise warre any more; the slaine or wounded of the English were (through the mercy of Christ) but a few: One of them being shot through the body, neere about the breast, re- garding it not till of a long time after, which caused the bloud to dry and thicken on either end of the arrow so that it could not be drawne forth his body without great difficulty and much paine, yet did he scape his life, as may appear by one passage which
I shall here relate: thus it came to passe, As Souldiers were upon their march, close by a great thicket, where no eye could penetrate farre, as it often falls out in such wearisome ways, where neither men nor beasts have beaten out a path; some Souldiers lingering behind their fellows, two Indians watching their opportunity, much like a hungry hauke, when they supposed the last man was come up, who kept a double double double distance in his march, they sudden and swiftly snatched him up in their tallens, hoising him upon their shoulders, ran into the swamp with him; the Souldier unwilling to be made a Pope by being borne on mens shoulders, strove with them all he could to free himself from their hands; but, like a careful Command-der, one Captaine Davenport, then Lieutenant of his company, being diligent in his place to bring up the reare, coming up with them, followed with speed into the swamp after him, having a very severe cutlace typed to his wrist, and being well able to make it bite fore when he set it on, resolving to make it fall foul on the Indians bones, he soone overtook them, but was prevented by the buckler they held up from hitting them, which was the man they had taken; It was matter of much wonder to see with what dexterity they hurled the poore Souldier about, as if they had been handling a Lacedaemonina shield, so that the nimble Captaine Davenport could not, of a long time, fasten one stroke upon them; yet, at last, dying their tawny skin into a crimson colour, they cast downe their prey, and hasted throrow the thickets for their lives. The Souldier thus redeemed, had no such hard usage, but that he is alive, as I suppose, at this very day:

The Lord in mercy toward his poore Churches having thus destroyed these bloudy barbarous Indians, he returnes his people in safety to their vessels, where they take account of their prisoners: the Squawes and some young youths they brought home with them, and finding the men to be deeply guilty of the crimes they undertook the warre for, they brought way onely their heads as a token of their victory. By this means the Lord strook a trembling terror into all the Indians round about, even to this very day.


Loveing frend I reseved yrs dated may ye 4th / 59 / by john minor…
…Certainly ye wel know ye english did posess all
Those parts as conquered lands for from new haven to Sashquakatt wee ded persue ym ye pequets killed divers att new haven & att Cupheag only one house or ye carcass of one wee found att milford with out inhabitants att the Cutting of ye pequots / all there friends & confederates fled alsoe being undr the Same condemnation with ym / tis true some att paquanock did formerly stand out but ye pequets did kill severall of ym & Conquered ye Country Soe brought all ye Indians att long Island & ye may now there tributaries from pequit to accomhett beyond Hudsons River ye English Conquering ye pequots Conquered them alsoe & tooke Captives from Sashquahet poquanocke for thay Several of ym lived wth ye pequots in time of there prosperity & fought against ye English alsew att sashquakett / paquannock Indians fought against us likewise / some of there wome are att Nevis & in ye bay as Captives to this Day…


[20] Then 3 dayes after the fight came waiandance Next broth’ to the old Sachem of long Ilan and hauing been rcommended to me by Mior Gibbons he came to know if we were angrie with all Indeans, I answered No, but only with such as has kild English-men, he asked me wheth’r they y’tliued upon long Iland might cum to trade with us, I Said no, nor we

[21] with them for if I should send my boate to trade for corne and you haue pequits with you and if my boat should cum into sum crik by reason of bad weath’ they might kill my men, & I shall thnke y’ you of long Iland haue done it, and So we may kill all you for y’ pequits but if you will kill all the pequits y’ come to you and send me th’ heads y’n I will giue to you as to weakwash and you shall haue trade with us, then, Said he I wil goe to my broth’, for he is the great Sacehm of all long Iland and if we may haue peace and trade with you we will giue you tribute as we did the pequits, then I said if you haue any Indeans y’[7] haue killed English you must bring th’ heads also, he answered not any one, and said that Gibbons my broth’ would haue tould you if it had been so, So he went away and did as I had said and sent me 5 heads, 3. & 4. heads for w’h I paid them y’n brought them as I had promised Then came Captaine
Stoten with an armie of 300 men from ye bay to kill the pequits, but they wear fled beyond New hauen to a swamp, I sent Wequash after them who went by Night to spie them out and ye armie folloed him, and found them at ye great Swamp who killed sum and tooke oth's and ye rest fled to ye Mowhakues with th' Sachem the ye Mohakues cut off his hed & sent it to Harford for then they all fered us……, but before

[22]
they went to ye great swamp they sent Tho Stanton ouer to long Island & Shelt' Iland to find pequits theare but there was none of ye Sachem waiandancet y' was a plimmoth w ye Comish's weare there and set there last, I say he had kild so many ye pequits and sent th' heds to me y' they durst not cum there and he and his men went with ye English to ye swamp and thus ye pequits weare queld at y' time,

[30]
…, but our New England 12 penne chronacle is stuffed with a cattalgoue of ye names of Some as if they had deserued Imortall fame but the right New England Millitarie worthies are left out for want of roome as Major Mason Captain undrill lieftennant Sielley &c who under-tooke the desparate way and designe to Mistick fort and kild 300 burnt the fort and tooke many prison-wers, thought they are not once named but honest Abraham thought it no shame to name the confed-

[31]
erates y' helped him to warre when he redeemed his both' lot, but uncas of Mistik and Waiandance at ye great Swamp, and euer since yo' trustie frend is forgotten and for our sakes persecuted to this day with fire and sword…

___


[34]
Immediately the whole Body of Pequots repaired to
that Fort where SASSACOUS the Chief Sachem did reside; charging him that he was the only Cause of all the Troubles that had befallen them and therefore they would Destroy both him and his; But by the Intreaty of their Counsellors they spared his Life; and consulting what Course to take, concluded there was no abiding any longer in their Country, and so resolved to fly unto several Parts. The greatest Body of them went towards MANHATANCE: And passing over Connecticut, they met with three English Men in a Shallop going for Saybrook, whom they slew: The English Fought very stoutly, as themselves Confessed, Wounding many of the Enemy.

About a Fortnight after our Return home, which was about one Month after the Fight at MISTICK, there Arrived in PEQUOT RIVER several Vessels from the MAS-SACHUSETS, Captain Israel Stoughton being Commander in Chief; and with him about One hundred and twenty Men; being sent by that Colony to pursue the War against the Pequots: The Enemy being all fled before they came, Except some few Straglers, who were surprised by the Mo-heags and others of the Indians, and by them delivered to the Massachusetts Soldiers.

[15] Connecticut Colony being informed hereof, sent forth- with forty Men, Captain Mason being Chief Commander; with some other Gent, to meet those of the Massachussets, to consider what was necessary to be attended respecting the future: Who meeting with them on the Massachussets in Pequot Harbour; after some time of consultation, concluded to pursue those Pequots that were fled towards Manhatance, and so forthwith arched after them, discovering several Places where they Rendezvoused and lodged not far distant from their several Removes; making but little haste, by reason of their Children, and want of Provision; being forced to dig for Clams, and to procure such other things as the Wilderness afforded: Our Vessels sailing along by the Shore. In about the space of three Days we all Arrived at New Haven Harbour, then called Quinnypiag. And seeing a great Smaok in the Woods not far distant we supposing some of the Pequots our Enemies might be there; we hastened ashore, But quickly discovered them to be Connecticut Indians. Then we returned aboard our Vessels, where we stayed some short time, having sent a Pequot Captive upon disco-
very, we named Luz; who brought us Tydings of the Enemy, which proved true; so faithful was he to us, though against his own Nation. Such was the Terror of the English upon them; that a Moheage Indian named Jack Eatow going ashore at that time, met with three Pequots, took two of them and brought them aboard.

We then hastened our March towards the Place where the Enemy was: And coming into a Corn Field, several of the English espied some Indians, who fled from the: They pursued them; and coming to the Top of an Hill, saw several Wigwams just opposite, only a Swamp intervening, which was almost divided in two Parts. Serjeant Palmer hastening with about twelve Men who were under his Command to surround the smaller Part of the Swamp, that so He might prevent the Indians flying: Ensign Danport, Serjeant Jeffries & c. entering the Swamp,

intended to have gone to the Wigwams, were there set upon by several Indians, who in all probability were deterred by Serjeant Palmer. In this Skirmish the English slew but few: two or three of themselves were Wounded: The rest of the English coming up, the Swamp was surrounded.

Our Council being called, and the Question propounded, How we should proceed, Captain Patrick advised that we should cut down the Swamp; there being many Indian Hatchets taken, Captain Traske concurring with him; but was opposed by others: Then we must pallizado the Swamp; which was also opposed: Then they would have a Hedge made like those of Gotham; all which was judged by some almost impossible, and to no purpose, and that for several Reasons, and therefore strongly opposed. But some others advised to force the Swamp, having time enough, it being about three of the Clock in the Afternoon: But that being opposed, it was then propounded to draw up our Men close to the Swamp, which would much lessened the Circumference; and with all to fill up the open Passages with Bushes, that so we might secure them until the Morning, and then we might consider further about it. But neither of these would pass; so different were our Apprehensions; which was very grievous to some of us, who concluded the Indians would make an Escape in the Night, as easily they
might and did: We keeping at great distance, what better could be expected? Yet Captain Mason took Order that the Narrow in the Swamp should be cut thro’; Which did much shorten our Leaguer. It was resolutely Performed by Serjeant Davis.

We being loth to destroy Women and Children, as also the Indians belong to that Place: whereupon Mr. Tho. Stanton a Man well acquainted with the Indian Language and Manners, offered his Service to go into the Swamp and treat with them: To which we were somewhat back-ward, by reason of some Hazard and Danger he might be exposed unto: But his importunity prevailed: Who going to them, did in a short time return to us, with near Two Hundred old Men, Women and Children; who

Delivered themselves to the Mercy of the English. And so Night drawing on, we beleaguered them as strongly as we could. About half an Hour before Day, the Indians that were in the Swamp attempted to break through Captain Patrick’s Quarters’ but were beaten back several times; they making a great Noise, as their Manner is at such Times, it sounded round about our Leaguer: Whereupon Captain Mason sent Serjeant Stares to inquire into the Cause, and also to assist if need required; Capt. Traske coming also in to their Assistance: But the Tumult growing to a very great Heighth, we raised our Siege; and Marching up to the Place, at a Turning of the Swamp the Indians were forcing out upon us; but we sent them back by our small Shot.

We waiting a little for a second Attempt; the Indians in the mean time facing about, pressed violently upon Captain Patrick, breaking through his Quarters, and so escaped. They were about sixty or seventy as we were informed. We afterwards searched the Swamp & found but few Slain. The Captives we took were about One Hundred and Eighty; whom we divided, intending to keep them as Servants, but they could not endure that Yoke; few of them continuing any considerable time with their Masters.

Thus did the Lord scatter his Enemies with his strong Arm! The Pequots now became a Prey to all Indians. Happy were they that could bring in their Heads to the
English: Of which there came almost daily to Windsor, or Hartford But the Pequots growing weary hereof, sent some of the Chief that survived to mediate with the English; offering that If they might but enjoy their Lives, the would become the English Vassals, to dispose of them as they pleased. Which was granted them. Whereupon ONKOS and MYANTONIMO were sent for; who with the Pequots met at Hartford. The Pequots being demanded, How many of them were then living? Answered, about One Hundred and Eighty or Two Hundred. There were then given to ONKOS, Sachem of MONHEAG, Eighty; to

[18]
MYANTONIMO, Sachem of NARRAGANSETT, Eighty; and to NYNIGRETT, Twenty, when he should satisfy for a Mare of Edward Pomroye’s killed by his Men. The Pequots were then bound by COVENANT, That none should inhabit their native Countyr, nor should any of them be called PEQUOTS any more, but MOHEAGS and NARRAGANSETTS for ever. Shortly after, about Forty of them went to Moheag; others went to Long Island; the rest settled at Pawcatuck, a Place in Pequot Country, contrary to their late Covenant and Agreement with the English.

Anonymous Account in Increase Mather, *A relation of the troubles which have hapned in New-England by reason of the Indians there from the year 1614 to the year 1675.* John Foster: Boston, MA, 1677.

[48] Upon this notable victory Sassacus his heart failed him, his men of war being many of them cut off, so that he fled his Countyr, breaking down his Forts, and burning his Wigwams himself, he marched away by land, with some men, women and Children, their good being sent away in Cannoos. The English at Say-brook had notice of the Cannoos and an advantage to stop their passage, but Capt. Kilpatrick delayed until the opportunity was gone, so that Sassacus with his routed train coming up to the Canoos six miles from Saybrook Fort, was transported over the River, and fled towards Quinipiack. Being now enraged he solicited his men of War, that they might go, and fall upon the English at Connecticut, but some of them not consenting, that design of his was not put into execution; he therefore fled to the Mohawks, who (being as is supposed excited thereto by the revengfull Narragansets) cut off his head.
Many of the Pequots before Sassacus his death returned to their country again; but soldiers being sent from Massachusets the returned Pequots were presently distressed, ours ran sacking their country, and settling a garrison therein, quickly came back to Saybrook, with one of the Pequot Sachims, and other Indian Captives. After which a supply of men from Connecticut, coming to the Massachusets Soldiers, they sailed westward in pursuit of the Pequots who were fled that way, sailing along to the westward of Monowuttuck, the

wind not answering their desires, they cast Anchor, where two Sachems from Long Island came to them, desiring peace and promising to deliver up whatever Pequots should fly to them for shelter, some scattering Pequots were then taken and slain, as also the Pequot Sachem, before expressed, had his head cut off, whence that place did bear the name of Sachems head. Being come near to Quinipiack observing a smoak, it was conjectured that the Enemy might be thereabouts, whereupon Indians were set on shore to hunt after them, but they could find no more then two, one of which was the Sachems son of that place, supposed to be Confederate with the Pequots. They promised to conduct the English to the Enemy, but failed in performance. After that they took another Indian Captive, who likewise engaged to lead the English upon the Pequots, but he directed them into quite contrary way, for which his life was deservedly taken from him. But an Indian called Luz, who was before taken Captive by our Souldiers in the Pequot country, with two other Indians that were his kinsmen, promised if the English would give him, and his kinsmen their lives, He would conduct them to the Enemies the sought after. He did so, the Pequots with other Indians belonging to those parts, were found near a Swamp, into which they did betake theselves for safety, upon the approach of the English Souldiers. After a while, and Indian came out of the Swamp unarmed, with a present of Wampam, The English declared to him that they came not to take away the lives of the Indians nor their goods, if they would deliver up the murtherers that were amongst them. After which ninety nine came forth with their Sachim, who offered as a present all the Estate he had to dispose of, that was nothing but the Coat on his back, being a Bears Skin. He was sent into the Swamp again to signify to the Pequots there lurking, that if they would bring forth the murderers it should be better for them, which they would not do, but at last professed they had lived toghether, and they would dye together.

There were about seventy or eighty Indians in the Swamp, amongst whom there were twelve murderers. So then the English beset the Swamp; and shot in upon them, and the Indians at them, some of which were furnished with Guns. One in special that was climbing up
a Tree to shoot at the English, was espied by a Souldier, who sent a Bullet into him before the other could make his shot. In the night time the Indians brake away. Diligent search was the next day made in the Swamp for dead Indains, Not many, (as some have made Narration) but seven, and no more could be found. As for the Captives.

[50] a Guard was appointed to look after them, they were charged upon prril of their lives not to attempt running away; yet one of them betook himself to his heels, but a Souldier shot after him, and killed him, which struck a Terror into the rest of the Captives, that no man durst make an offer to escape. These things do I find related by Anonymus.

[53] Only I remember Capt. Davenport (that good man who was after wards Commander of the Castle at Boston, and there slain by lighening) once told me, that himself, with two or three more, engaged with no lesse that thirty Indians, and that there were seventeen arrows shot into his Coat, but having on a Coat of Male, none of those arrows hurt him, only one that happened to strike where he was not defended by his Coat.

Also he rescued a poor souldier, that was in extream danger of being devoured by those Wolves; For two Mastive-Indians that lay in ambush, as a party of souldiers passed by, supposing they had been all past, snatched hold of him whom they thought to be the last man, and were running away with him upon their shoulders, Capt. Davenport followed them with his drawn Cutlash, but still as he lifted up his hand to strike at them these Gigantine Salvages held up the poor man they were running away with, whereby for a while they secured their won bodyes from the blow, until a last missing the Englishman, Capt. Davenport smote one of the Indians, whereupon they threw Down their prey, and ran for their lives.

But to be serious, That which Governour Winthrop writeth in his Letter, published by Mr. Morton, is very memorable, viz. that in one fight, though the Indians coming up close to our men, shot their Arrows thick upon them, so as to pierce their hat brims, and their Sleeves, and Stockings, and other parts of their Cloaths, yet so miraculously did the Lord preserve them, as that (excepting three that rashly ventured into a Swamp after them) not one of them was wounded.

William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England, form the first planting thereof in the year 1607. But chiefly of the late Troubles in the two last
years, 1675 and 1676. To which is added a Discourse about the Warre with the Pequods In the year 1637. John Foster: Boston, MA, 1677.

[127]
This service being thus happily accomplished by these few hands that

[128]
Came from Connecticut, within a while after, the Forces sent from the Massachusetts under the conduct of Captain Stoughton as Commander in chief arrived there also, who found a great part of the work done to their hands, in the surprizal of the Pequods Fort as aforesaid, which yet was but the breaking of the nest, and the unkenneling those salvage Wolves, for the Body of them, with Sassacous the chief Sachem (whose very mane was a terror to all the Narrhagansets) were dispersed abroad and scattered all over their Country….

The rest of the Enemy being first fired out of their strong hold, were taken and destroyed, a great number of them, being seized in the places where they intended to have hid themselves, the rest fled out of their own Country over Connecticut River, up toward the Dutch Plantation…

[129]
Our Soldiers went by Water towards New Haven, whether they heard, and which in reason was most likely) they bent their course? Soon after they were informed of a great number of them, that had betaken themselves to a neighbouring place not far off, whither they might hope it was not like they should be pursued; but upon search they found fifty or sixty Wigwams, but without any Indians in any of them, but heard that they had passed along toward the Dutch Plantation, whereupon our Soldiers that were before, all embarked for Quillepiack, afterwards called New Haven, and being landed there, they had not far to march unto the place where it was most probable they should either find or hear of them; according in their march they met here & there with sundry of them, who they slew or took prisoners, amongst whom were two Sachems, whom they presently beheaded; to a third that was either a Sachem or near a kin to one, they gave his life upon condition that he should goe and enquire where Sassacous was, and accordingly bring them word; this Indian overlooking all other national or natural obligations, in consideration of his life that was received on that condition, proved very true and faithful to those that sent him, his order was to have returned in three dayes, but not being able within so short a time to make a full discovery of the business, & also find a handsome way to escape, he made it eight dayes before he returned , in which something fell our not a little remarkable, for those he was sent to discover, suspecting at the last by his withdrawing himself that he came for a Spye, pur-
sued after him, so as he was forced to fly for his life, and getting down to the Sea-side he accidently met with a Canooe a little before turned adrift, by which means he paddled by some shift or other so farr out of the harbor, that making a sign he was discerned of some on board one of the Vessels that attended on our Souldiers, by whome being taken up he made known what he had discovered: But after he was gone Sassacous suspecting (and not without just cause) what the matter was, made his escape from the rest with twenty or thirty of this men to the Mohawkes, by whome himself and they were all murthered afterward, being hired thereunto by the Narrhagansets, as was confidently affirmed & belived.

The rest of the Pequots from whome Sassacouse had made an escape, shifted every one form himself, leaving but three of four behind them (when a party of our Souldiers accordinge to the direction of him that was sent as a spy came upon the place) whom would not or could not tell them whither their Company were fled; but our Souldiers ranging up and down as providence guided them, at the last, July 13, 1637, they lighted upon a great number of them, they pursued in a small Indian town seated by the side of a hideous Swamp (near the place where Fairfield or Stratford now stand) into which they all slipt as well Pequods as natives of the place, before our men could make any shot upon them, having placed a Centinel to give warning. Mr. Ludlow and Capt. Mason with half a score of their men hapned to discover this crew. Capt. Patrick and Capt. Traske with about an hundred of the Massachuset Forces came in upon them presently after the alarm was given; such Commanders as first hapned to be there gave special order that the swamp should be surround-ed (being about a mile in Compas) but Lieutenant Davenport belonging to Capt. Traks his Company, not hearing the word of Command, with a dozen more of his Company in an over eager pursuit of the enemy rushed immediately in to the Swamp, where they were very rudely enteratined by those evening wolves that were newly kenneled there in, for Leift. Davenport was sorely wounded in the Body, John Wedgwood of Ipswich in the belly, and was laid hold on also by some of the Indians, Thomas Sherman of the said Ipswich in the neck, some of their neighbors that ventured in with them were in danger of the Enemies arrows that flew very thick about them, others were in as much hazard of being swallowed by the miery boggs of the Swamp wherein they stuck so fast, that if Serjeant Riggs of Roxbury had not rescued two, or three of them they had fallen into the hands of the enemy; but such was the strength and courage of those that came to the rescue, that some of the Indians being slain with the Swords, their friends were quickly reliev-ed, and drawn out of the mire and danger.

But the Indians of the place, who had for company sake run with their Guests the Pequods, into the swamp, did not love their friendship so well as to be killed with them also for company sake, wherefore they began to
bethink themselves that they had done no wrong to the English, and desired a parly which was granted, & presently understood by the ear of Thomas Stanton an exact Interpreter then at hand, upon which the Sachem. Of the place with several others their wives and children, that like better to live quietly in their wigwams then be buried in the Swampe came forth and had their lives granted them: after some time of

[131]

ther parley with these, the interpreter was sent in to offer the like terms to the rest, but they were Possessed with such a spirit of stupidity and sullenness that they resolved rather to sell their lives for what they could get there, and to that end began to let fly their arrows thick against him as intending to make his bloud some part of the price of their own, but through the goodness of God toward him, his life was not to be sold on that account, he being presently fetched off.

By this time night drawing on, our Commanders perceiving on which side of the Swampe the enemies were lodged, gave order to cut through, the Swamp with their swords, that they might the better hemme them round in one corner, which was presently done, and so they were besiged in all night, the English in the circumference plying them with shot all the time, by which meanes many of them were killed and buried in the mire, as they found the next day. The Swamp by the forementioned device being reduced to so narrow a compass, that our soldiers standing at twelve foot distance could surround it, the enemy was kept in all the night; but a little before day-break (by reason of the Fogge that up seth to arise about that time observed to be the darkest time of the night) twenty or thirty of the lustiest of the enemy brake through the Besiegers, and escaped away in to the woods, some by violence and some by stealth dropping away, some of whom notwithstanding were killed in the pursuit; the rest were left to the mercy of the Conquerors, of which many were killed in the Swampe like sullen dogs, that would rather in their self willedness and madness sit still to be shot through or cut in pieces, then receive their lives for the asking at the hand of those into whose power they were now fallen: Some that are yet living and worth of credit doe affirm, that in the morning entering in to the Swampe, they saw several heaps of them sitting close together, upon whom they discharged their pieces laden with ten or twelve pistol bullets at a time, putting the muzzels of their pieces under the boughs within a few yards of them, so as besides those that were found dead (near twenty) it was judged that many more were killed and sunk into the mire and never were minded more by friend or foe; of those who were not so desperate or sullen to sell their lives for nothing, but yielded in time, the male Children were sent to the Bermudas, of the females some were distributed to the English towns, some were disposed of among the other Indians to whom they were deadly enemies as well as to our selves.
John Mason, Connecticut Archives, RG001, Miscellaneous Papers, Series I, Volume I, Part I. 1659 09 20

[88]
…The pequots being Stirred & provoaked by forses Send frm ye Mattasuesets fell upon us frequently Invaadinge our quarters killing many our people especially in yt bloody massacre at weathersfield….

….God suceedinge us in our undertakings were Enabled & did expel the body of ye enmy out of their County without ye assistance or charge Of the Mattasesets neither did we ever Afterwards send for helpe or advise of y Mattasesets. for we assested wth 40 men in persuite of ye Enmy when ye enmy returned to pequet Country We beate ym out upon our owne account wth:out any Advisse to yr Mattasusets…

The Pequots were destroyed & fled there Country before we Combined with yr Mattasusets what was done before ye came there & our pasinge wth ym: was properly noe pt of their war.

Jo. Mason


[117]
Testimony of Captain Olmstead and Sergeant Tibballs About the Pequots.

The testimony of the said Thomas Tibball of Milford, Sen., aged seventy or thereabouts, testifieth that he being a soldiers in the Pequit War, being in pursuit of the Pequits, which Capt. Omsteed and amy others soldiers they pursued them as far as Sasqua; and find the Pequits and Sascoe Indians together, there was many shots passed between those Indians and the English against them, whereby several of the English were
wounded, and afterwards they went into the Pequit Swamp, so called; and after a parley between the Eng-
Hlis and them there was about eight or nine score came forth and surrendered themselves to the mercy of the English. And those Indians that came forth out of the swamp we took them and brought them away captives, and further saith not.

Capt. Richard Omsteed, of Norwark, aged seventy-six Years of age, or thereabouts, being at the same fight, tes-
Tifieth as is above written.

Sworn in court, Sept. 20, 1683, as attest.

[118]
Testimony of Netorah Concerning Pequot Captives.

Upon the examination of the Indian Netorah in the Court, he owned that the Pequit Indians came to them as they fled before the English, and that the Sasqua and the Paquamuck Indians went into the swamp along with them; and the English offering of them quarter, they came out of the swamp and resigned themselves and their deer-skins and wampum to them….

…All which the aforesaid Netorah testifies, as appears by these two interpreters then present, and subscribing thereto this 21st of September, 1683.

[121]
Indian Testimony Concerning Pequot Lands

The Indians testify; by name, Quontoson, aged seventy years of thereabouts; Tussawacombe, aged sixty years of age; Winnepoge, aged sixty years of age; Craucreeco, aged sixty-two years of age; Hetora, aged fifty-seven years of age; Nonopoge, aged fifty-eight years of age; That in the Pequit War, when the Pequits fled and the English pursued them, they coming this way being many in number and they but few, Sasaqua and Poquonock Indians fled into the swamp Munnacommock with the Pequits, now called the Pequit Swamp, in Fairfeild bounds, and did there join with the Pequits, and fight against the English. Whilst in the swamp, Mr. Thomas Stanton being with the English made a speech, and told the Sasqua and Poquonock Indians that the Pequits were the English great enemies, and that, if they, the Sasqua and Poquonock Indians, would come forth and peaceably sur-
render themselves to the English mercy, they should have their lives. Whereupon they came forth and surrendered themselves, with wampum, skins, and their land. Then the English told them that they should have sufficient lands for themselves and theirs to live upon. Four of whom were personally in the swamp, and the other two, Winnepoge and Nonopoge, were not.


[200] August 1637

The Court did intreat the magistrats to treat wth the elders about a day of thanksgiveing upon the returne of the souldiers, & the souldiers to bee feasted by their townes.

[201] It was referd to the counsel to take order about the Indian squaws./
[Sidebar: Disposing of ye Indian squaws]

[216] November 20, 1637

A Declaration, sent the Coppey to Conecticut, about the Pecoits Country, & Quonapiack

Whereas it hath pleased the Lord, of his great mcy, to deliver into o' hands o' enemies, the Pecoits & their allies, & that thereby the lands & places wch they possessed are by just title of conquest fallen to us, & o' friends & assotiants, upon the river of Conectecot, & wherasw, by subdewing those o' enemies, not onely o'selues & o' said assotiants have obtained rest & safety, but opportunity is also given for peacable habitation to all such as shall hearafter inhabite the lands of o' said enemies, both at Pecoit & Quinapiack, & the parts beyond towards the Dutch, wee do hereby declare the just right & title s^ch o'selues & o' said assotiants upon Conecticot have to all the said lands & territories….

[253] [Date: 1638 2/3]

It was ordered, that 3L 8sh^s should bee paid Leiften^t Davenport for the psent, for charge disbursed for the slaves, w^ch when they have earned it, hee is to repay it back againe. [Sidebar: Leift Davenport to keep ye slaves]


[10]
June 2d, 1637. A Generall Corte Att Harteford

It is ordered y' there shalbe sent forth 30 men out of the sev'all plantacons in this River of Conectecott to sett downe in the Pequot Countrey & River in place convenient to maynteine o' right y' god by Conquest hath given to us, & Lieftenn' Seely shall have the Comande of them. The men are to be raised 14 out of Harteford, ten out of Windsor, 6 outh of Wythersfesfield.

It is ordered y' 60 bushells of Corne shal be p'uided for the designe abouesd, Windsor 20, Harteford 28, Wythersfeld 12, 1th of Pease, 2 bushells of Oatemeale, 150 pounde of Beefe, 80lb of Butter, (vizt) Windsor 30, Wythersfeld 30, Harteford 20, fish.

26 June 1637, Harteford Gen'call Corte

It is ordered that 10 men more shalbe levied out of the plantacons aforesaide to goe in the designe ag' the Pequoitts as an adition to the form' 30, (vizt) 5 out of Harteford, Windsor 3, Weathersfeld 2.

It is ordered y' Mr. Haine & Mr. Ludlowe shall goe to the mouth of the River to treate & conclude w' frenedes of the Bay either to joine w' their forces in p'secutinge o' designe against o' enemies or if they see cause by advise to interprise any Accon accordinge to the force we have. And to parle w' the bay aboute o' setting downe in the Pequoit Countrey.

It is ordered y' there shalbe 1 hogg p'vided at Wythersfield for the designe in hande, w' is conceived to be Nathaniel Footes, 20lb of Butter, half C of Cheese; Harteford 20lb of Butter, half hundred of Cheese; Windsor 1 Ram goate, 20lb of Butter, half C of Cheese, 1 gallon of stronge Water; Harteford 1 C of beeve from Mr. Whittinge, Windsor 3 bushells of mault, 2 from Wythersfield, Mr Wells 2.


[225] Capt. Stoughton and his company, having pursued the Pequots beyond Connecticut, and missing of them, returned to Pequot River, where they were advertised, that one hundred
of them were newly come back to a place some twelve miles off. So they marched thither by night, and surprised them all. They put to death twenty-two men, and reserved to sachems, hoping by them to get Sasacus, (which they promised). All the rest were women and children, of whom they gave the Naragansetts thirty, and our Massachusetts Indians three, and the rest they sent hither.

A pinace, returning, took a canoe with four Indians near Block Island. We sent to Miantunnomoh to know what they were, and after we discharged all save one, who was a Pequod, whom we gave Mr. cutting to carry into England.

There were sent to Boston forty-eight women and children. There were eighty taken, as before is expressed. These were disposed of to particular person in the country. Some of them ran away and were brought again by the Indians our neighbors, and those we branded on the shoulder.

Mr. Stoughton, with about eight of the English, whereof Mr. Ludlow, Capt. Mason and [blank] of Connecticut, were part, sailed to the west in pursuit of Sasacus, etc. At Quinepiack, they killed six, and took two. At a head of land a little short they beheaded two sachems; whereupon they called the place Sachem’s Head. About this time they had given a Pequod his life to go find out Sasacus. He went, and found him not far off; but Sasacus, suspecting him, intended to kill him, which the fellow perceiving, escaped in the night, and came to the English. Whereupon Sascus and Mononotto, their two chief sachems, and some twenty more, fled to the Mohawks, But eighty of their stoutest men, and two hundred others, women and children, were at a place within twenty or thirty miles of the Dutch, whither our men marched, and, being guided by a Divine Providence, came upon them, where they had twenty wigwams, hard by a most hideous swamp, so thick with bushes and so quagmiry, as men could hardly crowd into it. Into this swamp they were all gotten. Lieut. Davenport and two or three more, that entered the swamp, were dangerously wounded by the Indian arrows, and with much difficulty were fetched out. Then our men surrounded the swamp, being
a mile about, and shot at the Indians, and they at them, from three of the clock in the afternoon till they desired parley, and offered to yield, and life was offered to all that had not shed English blood. So they began to come forth, now some and then some, till about two hundred women and children were come out, and amongst them the sachem of that place, and thus they kept us two hours, till night was come on, and then the men told us they would fight it out; and so they did all the night, coming up behind the bushes very near our men, and shot many arrows into their hats, sleeves, and stocks, yet (which was a very miracle) not one of ours wounded. When it was near morning, it grew very dark, so as such of them as were left crept out at one place and escaped, being (as was judged) not above twenty at most, and those like to be wounded; for in the pursuit they found some of them dead of their wounds. Here our men gat some booty of kettles, trays, wampum, etc., and the women and children were divided, and sent some to Connecticut, and some to the Massachusetts. The sachem of the place, having yielded, had his life, and his wife and children, etc. The women, which were brought home, reported that we had slain in all thirteen sachems, and that there were thirteen more left. We had now slain and taken, in all, about seven hundred. We sent fifteen of the boys and

[228]
two women to Bermuda, by Mr. Peirce; but he, missing it, carried them to Providence Isle.

[229]
5. Mr. Hooker and Mr. Stone came, with Mr. Wilson, from Connecticut by Providence; and, the same day, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Pincheon, and about twelve more, came the ordinary way by land, and brought with them a part of the skin and lock of hair of Sasacus and his brother, and five other Pequod sachems, who, being fled to the Mohawks for shelter, with their wampum, being to the value of five hundred pounds, were by them surprised and slain, with twenty of their best men. Mononottoh was also taken, but escaped wounded. They brought news also of divers other Pequods, which had been slain by other

[230]
Indians, and their heads brought to the English; so that now there had been slain and taken between eight and nine hundred. Whereupon letters were sent to Mr. Stoughton and the rest, to call them all home.

[108]  
**To John Winthrop, 31 July 1637**

…Sir I here yet not of any of the runaway Captives at amongst

[109]  
our neighbours. Yesterday I heard that 2 scapt from them to the Pequt. If any be or doe come amongst them I suppose they shall be speedily returned, or I shall certifie where the default is.

Sir I desire to be truly thanckfull for the Boy intended. His Father was of Sasquaukit where the last fight was: and fought not with the English as his mother (who is with you and 2 children more) certyed [certified] me. I shall endeavor his good, and the common [good], in him. I shall appoint some to fetch him: only I request that you would please to give a name to him.

[112]  
**To Governor John Winthrop, 20 August 1637**

[114]  
…Miantunnomu…

…, he saith, all my company were disheartened, and they all and Cutshamoquene desired to be gone; and yet, saith he, two of my men (Wagonckwhut and Maunamoh) were their guide to Sesquankit from the river’s mouth.


[430]  
**Daniel Patrick to the Governor and Council of War in Massachusetts**

….and heering a ruemore of  
Pequot dispersion, alsoe having taken canoes laden with al sorts  
of Indean howsell stuff passinge by the rivers mouth I guest a proabbillitie of it, and resolude to take 10 men with the pinace and goe observe the mo- 
tione and posture of Pequote river, but before I went Cobbine beets and 2 or 3 more weare cut of cominge downe in a shallop from Quenchechterqued, the Dutch yacht broght us worede, whose had bine to carry home our captive mades. Captane Underhill and I went out and founde the shallope ruinated,
and the INdeans fled. next day being come home, one of the slane men came
driving by saybrooke, stuck with 3 or 4 arrows, his cloths one, his bandeleors
about hime, and his sworde under his arme readye drawne, being one of Mr.
Michaels men…..

[431]
Narreganset Sachems, whoe blamed the baye of procrastination, informd
us of the Pequots desereting there Cuntrye, as never to returne in there Judge-
ments, of there flight at present to Quinopenage, which I witness to, having
seen, and as I sayd taken 2 of there Canoes, but then not acquainted with
there intended progress, that ther cheyfe eandevor for a while till after waye
made to the mowhoake…..
…40 or 50 Pequots remayne at
longe Iland, 300 fitt for fight at quinnopiage. Nowe if those at Quinnopiage
avoyde to the Owhoake, or if but 50 mile above the River townes, as some
thinke, what will you doe with or where will you impoye our 200 men.

Narregansets this 19 of June 1637

[433]
Roger Williams to John Winthrop

New Providence this 4th of the weeke, mane [ca. June 21, 1637]

[434]
He relateds that there is now ridign below 3 pinnaces (the names of the
M[aste]rs Quick, Jiglies and Robinson): and the 2 Shalops as also that the
other whereof – Jackson of Salem is m[aste]r was in Company with them
…Sir I heare our lo[ving] friends Mr. Stoughton Mr. Traske etc. are on their
way and 160 the intended number) with them. I hope the Continuance of
the number will be seasonable, if not for Pursuit of Sascous and the Pequots
(of whome it is said that they are gone farr and finally) yet for the quelling of
their Confederates the Wunnashowatuckoogs and Monashackotoogs etc. who
live nearer to you on the westward etc.

[435]
Israel Stoughton to John Winthrop

Honored Sir, By this Pinnace being Giggles, you shall Receive 48or 50
women and Children, unlesse there stay anywhere to be helpful, etc….

At present Mr. Haynes, Mr. Ludlo, Capteyne Mason and 30 men are with
us in Pequid River, and we shall the next weeke joyne in seeing what we can
do against Sasacos, and an other great Sagamore: momomattuck: Here is
yet good ruff worke to be done. And how deere it will cost is unknowne:
Sasacos is resolvd to sell his life and so the other with their Company as deere
as they can: but we doubt not but God will give him to us; we are in a faire way. one of the former that we toke (or that were taken to our hands in a great measure) is a great Sachim, the 3rd of the pequids: whom we reserve for a help, and find Gods providence directed it well, for we are al cleere he is like to do us good: yet we are far from giving him any assurance of life we see so much worke behind that we dare not dismiss more men yet:

we hope to find a way to bring them in plentifuuly, and to get the Murderers too: and to make their assosiatbs tributary if they still adheare to them: for we heare of a great Number up the Country among the Neepenetts: but we shall not deale with them without your advice, unless more remotely.

…

we have settled on a place for our randavooze: not full to our Content but the best we could for present: upon the Mouth of Pequid River, on the Noanticot side, where we have 200 acres corne if not 2 or 300 neere at hand, and a curious spring of water within our pallizado, and may by great Gunns Command the River.

So the Charg of keeping this fort need not be great, seeing Corne, water and Wood are so neere at hand: and fishing etc.

[440]
Daniel Patrick to Increase Nowell

[441]
…Sassecous is at longe Ilande, and mamenatucke at quenepiague, or lately gone to the Mowhoake. Moheegins and Narregansets I doubt will not longe agree, nor will Neantucke next to Narregansets willinglye be brought under his subiectione; wee goe the first winde for longe Ilande to salute Sassecous….

From Pequott this 6 of Julye 1637

[452]
Richard Davenport to Hugh Peter

…the same eveing in the sixt day of the weeke186 wee went toward Long Iland and sent in a shallop with an Indian to espy our enemy Sasacoos: but hee not being there wee had a Sachem came aboord us who tould us hee was gone thence to Quenepiacke and that himself would goe to bee out guide to find him out: which motion wee accepted of hee also promising his willingness that as Long Iland had payd tribute to Sasacas hee would procure it to us. The next day being the lords day wee came to a harbor about 3 leagus short of quenepiak where wee lay that day that morning 4 Indians went out for spyes who tooke 2 pecott Indians whom after examination with 2 prisoners more wee put to death that night and called the place Sacheme head: the second day of the week we came to que-ne-piacke

186 DN Note: The 6th Day being Saturday
and coming into the harbor wee saw a smoake on the shore and speedily landed and sent out spys who speedily returned and told us they were Conecticut Indians and brought downe 4 Indians with them: upon the nose wee repayrd to the barks.

Yet the Counsell thought meet to send my selfe with 20 men to see the truth: which a little before day I did upon one side of the River found noe signe of Indians but wading over the River after 2 hours seeking wee found som scouting pecotts it pleased god to deliver to our hands 7 of them one sachem 5 wee slew 2 women wee brought aboard haveing taken all by Runing and in an extreame Raine.

As soone as wee got aboard that day about 12 of Clocke wee were all landed on the other side to pursue Sasacoos that afternoone; the next day and the 5th day wee marched after them and haveing found the base Cowardlines of the Indians being out of hope of the enemy wee fell to cutting downe all the Corne in which time wee took in the corne a Pecott man very poore and weake hee tould us of som squaws that were not far of: at the same instant some of our Indians tould us they hear som cutting wood another way: whereupon part of the Company went to the one and part to the other: it pleased god to lead my Captain one way and my selfe another way with Captain Patricke: and Leitnent Seilley with my Captain: it was our day to lead and after 2 miles march wee came where they were and suddenly coming to the place there wigwams being upon the edge of the swamp as soone as ever they saw us they tooke the swamp. It pleased god it was not very great, and our Company did surround it:

For my part I judged best while the terror was upon them to fall in upon them and calling a file of men entered the swamp: overtook a man and a sachem Child and thrust him through with my pike twice: going further, I perseaued I had but 3 me with mee and suddenly one of [them] cryed out Leitnent they kill mee they kill mee: with that I saw him haveing four stout Rougus upon him downe the lord helped mee soone to make three of them repent their Closing, the fourth held him still and soe sheltred himself with the Englishman that I could not come to make a thrust at him yet after som tryall the lord gave him his wound in the belly and soe left his prey: all which time a Crew stood shooting upon mee at 12 foot distance they stook eleven arros in my Coat and hat and Cloths and flesh: onely 2 in my flesh: now all had left mee but god stood to mee and after this they left mee and runn and I retreated having onely a halfe pike and my Cutles: upon our shooting the Rest of our Company came thither and found us about the swamp and the Indians in it: then they got a Pecott and came to parley Sasacuos was gone: and all their women came out about ninescore it was and is lamentable to see into what condition they have rough themselves all seeking one anothers Ruine and every one crying out of each other: then were wee that were hurt sent to the pinaces about six leagus: and coming
[454] againe with them wee found the Company also well: many Indians killd and som runn away in the night: by what default I known not: yet I hope in mercy.

my owne wounds are one in the left arme through the arme close in the arme pitt which head was taken out in the under side my Arme with great paine the other is on the right side my brest which was through my Coat: which is not deepe 3 dayes I was in exceeding paine haveing the muslles hurt…

the souldiers that are hurt two of Ipswich Tho: Sherman and Jon. Wedgwood whom god saved by mee the other Edw: Shorthose of Charles-Towne….

…wee are now in the way to Pecott with almost 100 Indian women and Children aboord Goodman Jackson and 45 souldiers when I know more you shall heare More: my Captain and Tho: Lauthoup salute you …

Richard Davenport

[Ca. July 17, 1637]

Conetecut men have had their equall share in women and treys the princes treasurers are run from him with his wampum and hee and Mo-monottuk with 20 men are fled to the Mowhoak: wee have Momonotuk squaw and children

I pray tell my Colonell Mr. Ludlow is well who was at this business and narrowly mist a shott with an arrow.

[456]
John Winthrop to William Bradford

Worthy Sir,…

…About 80 of our men haveing costed along towards the dutch plantation, (some times by water, but most by land) mett hear, and ther, with some pequents, whom they slew or tooke prisoners, 2 sachems they tooke, and hebeaded And not hearing of Sassacous (the cheefe sachem) they gave a prisoner his life, to goe and find him out. He wente and brought them word wher he was, but Sassacouse suspecting him to be a spie, after he was gone fled away, with some 20 more, to the Mowakes; so our men missed of him. Yet deviding them selves, and ranging up and downe, as the providence of God guided them (for Indeans were all gone, save 3 or 4 And they knew not whither to guid them, or els would not) upon the 13 of this month, they light upon a great company of them viz. 80 strong men, and 200 women, and children, in a small Indean towne, fast by a hideous swamp, which they all slipped Into before out men could get to them. Our captains were not then come together, but ther was mr. Ludlow, and Captaine Masson, with some 10 of their men, and Captaine Patrick with some 20 or more of his; who shooting at the Indeans, Captaine Trask with 50 more came soone in at the noyse;
then they gave order to surround the swamp, it being about a mile about;
but Leutetanete Davenport, and some 12 more, not hearing that command,
fell into the swamp among the Indians. the swamp was so thick with shrub
woode, and so boggie with all, that some of them stuck fast, and received
many shott. Leutenant Davenport was dangerouly wounded about his
armehole, and another shott in the head, so as fainting, they were in great
danger to have been taken by the Indians; but Sargante Rigges, and Jeffery

and 2 or 3 more rescued them, and slew diverse of the Indians, with their
swords. After they were drawn out, the Indians desired parley; and were
offered (by Thomas Stanton, our Interpretor) that if they would come out,
and yeeld them selves, they should hae their lives all that had not their
hands in the English blood; wherupon the sachem fo the place came forth,
and an old man or 2 and their wives and children; and after that some other
women and children, and so they spake 2 howeres, till it was night. then
Thomas Stanton was sente into them againe, to call them forth; but they said,
they would selle their lives their, and so shott at him so thicke, as If he had
not cried out, and been presently rescued, they had slaine him. Then our men
cut of a place of the swamp with their swords, and cooped the Indians into
so narrow a compass, as they could easier kill them throw the thikets, so they
continued all the night, standing aboute 12 foote one from an other, and the
Indians coming close up to our men, shot their arrows so thicke, as they
pierced their hatte brimes, and sleeves and stockins, and other parts of
their cloaths, yet so miraculously did the lord preserve them, as not one of
them was wounded, save those 3 who rashly went into the swamp. When it
was nere day, It grue very darke, so as those of them which were left, dropt
away between our men, though they stood but 12 or 14 foote asunder; but
were presently discovered, and some killed in the pursute. Upon searching of
the swamp thenext morning, they found 9 slaine, and some they pulled up,
whome the Indians had buried in the mire; so as they doe thinke that, of all
this company, not 20 did escape, for they after found some, who dyed in their
flight, of their wounds received. The prisoners were devided, some of those of
the river, and the rest to us; of these we send the male children to Bermuda,
by mr. William Peirce, and the women and maid children are disposed aboute
in the townes. Ther have been now slaine and taken in all aboute 700. The
rest are dispersed, and the Indians in all quarters so terrifed, as all their
friends are afraid to receive them. 2 of the Sachems of Long Iland came to
mr. Stoughton and tendered them selves to be tributaries, under our protect-

ion. And 2 of the Neepnett Sachems have been with me to seeke our friend-
ship. Amonge the prisoners we have the wife and children of Mononotto, a
womon of a very modest countenance and behaviour. It was by her media-
tion that they 2 English maids were spared from death, and were kindly
used by her; so that I have taken charge of her. One of her first requests was
that the English would not abuse her body and that her children might not
be taken from her. Those which were wounded were fetched of soone by
John Galopp who came with his shalop in a happie houre, to bring them victuals, and to carrie their wounded men to the pinnass, wher our cheefe surgeon was, with mr. Willson, being aboute 8 leagues of.

Jo: Winthrop

the 28 of the 5 month 1637

The captains reporte, we have slaine 13 sachems; but Sassacouse and Monotto are yet living.

[ 490]
Possession House this 4\textsuperscript{th} day of the Week: Mo: 6\textsuperscript{th} [ca. August 23, 1637]

…there came some Mohegens to the house, and brought the [hands] of a reat Sachem, as they said greater then Sasacus, hee being Momonotuk Samm, a mighty fellow for curradge, and one that I know by some experience his desperateness in the swamp: for as I gather by the description of him, and also the Indians report that slew him that hee sayd hee kild one in the swamp, shooting him in the belley; and another he killd with arrows, which was my selfe, but, blessed be God, wee all live. 2 days after this, the same Indians kild another, who was then runn away from Sasacus: hee sayd hee thought that Sasaus was kild; for that Monowhoak had beset

[491]
the wigwam where they were, and soe fell upon them, and this man lying at the doore ran away: but what credit to give to it wee knew not. 2 days since I went up to the head of this river with 20 men to cut corne or gather beans, and coming thither I found a great company of Mohegens, who were returned to their countrey, about 500 of men, wo[men] and children. They were som what fearefull at first, but after spoke with us and loveingly intreated us. They tell for certain that Sasacus is killd, as the former suspected, and 40 men with him, and some women. 6 men are escaped, whereof Momoonotuk is one. I perseae the Indians would bee glad to make women of all the Pecotts now, except the sachems and capt. and murtherers: but them they would kill….